



EURISLAM



FINDING A PLACE FOR ISLAM IN EUROPE

"CULTURAL INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MUSLIM
IMMIGRANTS AND RECEIVING SOCIETIES"

FINAL INTEGRATED REPORT



Finding a Place for Islam in Europe. Cultural Interactions between Muslim Immigrants and Receiving Societies

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Final report EURISLAM

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EURISLAM

Finding a Place for Islam in Europe



EURISLAM is a European comparative research project funded in the 7th Framework Programme for Research – Social Science and Humanities of the European Commission. Answers were sought to the questions how different traditions of identity, citizenship, and church-state relations have affected European immigration countries' incorporation of Islam, and what the consequences are of these approaches for interactions between migrants, their offspring, and the receiving society?

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Executive summary

The aim of this research is to provide a systematic analysis of cross-national differences and similarities in countries' approaches to the cultural integration of immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. The countries studied in this research project are Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The core research question can be formulated as follows: 'How have different traditions of national identity, citizenship and church-state relations affected European immigration countries' incorporation of Islam, and what are the consequences of these approaches for patterns of cultural distance and interaction between Muslim immigrants and their descendants, and the receiving society?' In order to answer this question, policy differences are related to cross-national variation in cultural distance and interaction between Muslims and the receiving society population. Different methodologies are combined, allowing for a triangulation of research findings and a combination of quantitative and qualitative insights.

This research evaluates how different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations have affected the European public debate around Islam in the last ten years. Different ways in which nation-states deal with religious and cultural differences are demonstrated. Moreover, the ways in which the forms and scopes of public debates take different configurations at national and European level are outlined. Demonstrated is that educational attainment, labour market position, religious identification and bridging social capital all form steady factors in explaining the social-cultural integration of European Muslims. However, the impact of these factors is relatively small compared to the effect of belonging to a specific group or community. In the last section of this report, the main findings of the EURISLAM project are connected to some recommendations for policy implementation.

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1. Introduction

1.1 What is the EURISLAM research project about?

1.1.1 Introduction

During the last decade or so, real and perceived problems related to the integration of immigrants have risen to the top of the political agenda in many parts of Western Europe. Above all, the cultural and religious integration of Muslims and Islam in Europe has been the cause for heated debate, controversy, and even violent actions. In 2005, a series of cartoons published in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, most of which depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad, led to protests in many Islamic countries, some of which escalated into violence. In 2008, the Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders released a short film named *Fitna*, in which the Islam is portrayed as a totalitarian ideology encouraging acts of terrorism, anti-Semitism, violence against women and homosexuals, subjugation of 'infidels' and Islamic universalism. The film unleashed a storm of protests in the Islamic world and stirred a still continuing debate in The Netherlands with regard to the integration of Muslims.

The question of cultural and religious integration of Muslims and Islam in Europe is one that has been related to different issues. Sometimes it is related to their marginal socio-economic position, arguing that their cultural and religious background are in itself a cause for inequalities in for example education, the job market, housing, etc. At other times, the question of cultural and religious integration of Muslims and Islam relates more to the role of the state and to the place of religion in society. Should the state be involved in religious matters, and if so how should it do this? Closely related is the question of national identity, a common theme in this discussion and one that opens up seemingly simple questions that have, nonetheless, proven to be rather elusive beyond their pure legal or political interpretations. What constitutes a nation or a people? Who are the French, the Dutch, and the Swiss? Who are they not? Are such things even important, and why so?

Elusive or not, these issues have proven to be an important factor in the formulation of practical solutions to problems related to the migration and integration of people moving across administrative, linguistic, and cultural borders. Because these movements are likely to affect processes at very different levels, e.g. at the level of the nation-state, the city neighbourhood, the family, and the individual, it is important to have a broad perspective in the analysis of patterns in integration. Both the policy making at the national and European, and the identities and feelings of individuals are important, and their relationship should be a key research interest for social scientists and policy makers alike. The EURISLAM research project aims to combine these different levels by integrating macro and micro perspectives to provide a broad picture on the socio-cultural integration of Muslim minorities in Western Europe.

In this introduction we will first discuss the research questions in detail and amplify the selection of countries and groups of people we have examined. Second, we will discuss how the research was conducted and how the work was divided between the different members of the consortium. Thirdly, we will provide an overview of all the data collected for the EURISLAM project and briefly discuss issues of data collection and quality. Finally,

we will introduce the outline of the report, which will follow a slightly different logic than the overall design of the EURISLAM project as described below. The chapters in the final report will each focus on a single topic that can span across different research fields of the project.

1.1.2 What is the core research question of the project?

Compactly formulated the core research question of the EURISLAM project can be summed up as follows:

‘How have different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations affected European immigration countries’ incorporation of Islam, and what are the consequences of these approaches for patterns of cultural distance and interaction between Muslim immigrants and their descendants, and the receiving society?’

Formulated as such the focus lies on the interaction between variables at the macro or the national level, e.g. citizenship and cultural policies, and variables at the micro or the individual level, e.g. feelings of acceptance and ideas of cultural distance. In the above research question, the cultural distance and interactions between Muslims and the receiving society population can therefore be seen as the main dependent variable that is partly explained by variations in the independent variable; national identity, citizenship and church-state relations. We can break our dependent variable down even further to clarify what we mean exactly by ‘cultural distance’. We are primarily interested in four main aspects that all relate to particular preconditions for peaceful and cohesive relations across cultural boundaries:

- **Language competencies** – as a precondition for communication across cultural boundaries. The idea here is clear. Sharing the same language promotes communication across group boundaries and enhances mutual identification.
- **Mutual identification and acceptance** – as a basis for solidarity across cultural and religious groups. Equally identifying as members of a country promotes the notion of common interest and therefore develops solidarity across groups (see Van Parijs, 2004).
- **Shared core norms and values** – as a basis for democracy in a culturally diverse society. Each democracy assumes a common core of democratic values (see Held, 1987), although it should be noted that there is some controversy over the content and interpretation of this core, which may include the equality of men and women; the separation of church and state and the freedom of speech and association.
- **Bridging social capital** – (social networks and trust) as a basis for social cohesion across cultural groups. As Granovetter (1973) has argued, network ties that reach outside the own social group (so-called ‘weak ties’) are also important for individuals’ access to scarce information and resources, such as job opportunities. Others, however, have emphasized the role of support networks of the own ethnic group in facilitating immigrants’ socio-economic participation (Portes & Zhou, 1996).

1.1.3 How is the research question translated into empirical research?

In order to make the core research question operational in terms of actual data collection, we formulate three more specific questions that translate the research into separate research fields:

I: 'What are the differences between European immigration countries in the way they deal with cultural and religious differences of immigrant groups in general, and of Muslims in particular?'

This first question has two general aspects. The first is formal, dealing specifically with legislation and jurisprudence on citizenship, anti-discrimination, and cultural accommodation. In the project this aspect will be handled and studied in the first research field **'Legislation and Jurisprudence'** (RF1) by ways of gathering a systematic set of cross-national indicators on a wide range of legislative issues using secondary sources. The second aspect of the above question is more informal and deals with how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in society are discussed in public. This more informal understanding of national identity and ways of dealing with cultural differences will be addressed in a second research field **'Identity Conceptions'** (RF2) that will analyse the debate surrounding Islam and Muslims in newspaper articles.

II: 'To what extent do we find differences across immigration countries in cultural distance and patterns of interaction between various Muslim immigrant groups and the receiving society population?'

In addressing this second question, we will first focus on attitudes, norms, and values; particularly those relating to democratic norms; gender relations and **family values; ethnic, religious** and receiving society identification; and attitudes towards relations across ethnic and religious boundaries. Besides that, we will look at cultural and religious resources and practices such as; language proficiency; adherence to various religious practices, e.g. attendance of religious services or wearing of a headscarf; interethnic and interreligious partnerships and marriages; the frequency and quality of interethnic and interreligious **relationships with neighbours, friends** and colleagues; and memberships in social and political organisations of the own ethnic and religious group as well as of the receiving society. Where relevant, these questions will also be asked to members of the dominant ethnic group of the receiving society or the national majority. This is especially important because cultural distance and interactions are obviously determined by the perceptions, attitudes and practices at both ends of the relationship. All these variables were gathered in a third research field **'Cultural Distance'** (RF 3) by way of conducting a survey. We undertook data collection making use of a standardized questionnaire and a CATI-procedure (computer assisted telephone interviewing) among a sample of Muslims and a sample of the ethnic majority group in our six participating countries (**Belgium, the UK, The Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Germany**). The Muslim sample was constituted by making use of the following procedure: first, through an onomastic method (name recognition method), a sampling frame was constituted making use of digital phone book records (including both land lines as cellular phones), aimed at identifying people of Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani and Ex-Yugoslav origin. Subsequently these people were

phoned up by a polling agency and screened whether they had indeed the aforementioned national origins and were themselves Muslims or of Muslim descent.

Table 1.1a provides information about the realised sample sizes in the different countries and for the different groups. In total 7256 people were interviewed: 1188 in **The Netherlands** (NL), 1317 in **Germany** (DE), 1184 in **Switzerland** (CH), 1185 in **the United Kingdom** (UK), 1197 in **Belgium** (BE) and 1185 in **France** (FR). In each country we had the aim of interviewing 385 members of the national majority group (predominantly non-Muslims) and 250 or 150 Muslims of each of the ethnic minority groups. In countries where this ethnic minority group is sizeable, 250 people were interviewed, and if it concerns a small group the sample was limited to 150 people. The aim was to strike a balance between cost-effectiveness, minimal sample size requirements and information on all ethnic groups in our six participating countries. In all countries data-collection was subcontracted to professional polling agencies.

Table 1.1a: Sample sizes for Muslim groups and ethnic majority non-Muslim comparison group

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR	TOTAL
National majority	385	390	383	387	386	383	2314
Ex-Yugoslavian	151	256	249	150	153	150	1109
Turkish	250	253	253	250	256	250	1512
Moroccan	250	256	147	148	255	257	1313
Pakistani	152	162	152	250	147	145	1008
N	1188	1317	1184	1185	1197	1185	7256

III: ‘To what extent can cross-national differences in cultural distance and patterns of interethnic and interreligious interaction be explained by the different approaches that immigration countries have followed towards the management of cultural difference in general, and Islam in particular?’

This third question about the relationship between policies and cultural distance has been addressed from several different angles. First, in the fourth research field **‘Cross-National Socio-Cultural Variables’** (RF 4) a multivariate analysis of the survey data has investigated to what extent cross-national differences on our various socio-cultural variables (see above under point II) persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. Moreover, these analyses can establish to what extent these cross-national differences are stable across Muslim groups from various countries of origin, and to what extent there are specific interaction effects between destination and source countries of immigration. The survey data will also be used to analyse the issue of the relation between cultural and socio-economic integration.

In addition to the analysis of the survey data, the relationship between policies and cultural distance is addressed in a fifth research field '**Transnational Families**' (RF 5) that favours a more detailed and qualitative analysis. In this research field members of transnational immigrant families were interviewed whose family members live in two or more of the immigration countries included in our study. This part of our research can be seen as a quasi-experiment, in which groups of people who are from a very similar background but who have ended up in different immigration contexts are qualitatively compared. Finally, a sixth research field '**Representatives Muslim Organisations**' (RF 6) introduces another layer of qualitative data by interviewing a crucial stakeholder in the wellbeing and integration of Muslim minorities in Europe; leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations.

1.1.4 Theoretical framework in which the research question can be understood

Before we move more into the details of the project, we will elaborate a little on how the research questions and research fields connect to a theoretical framework. In their essence, the questions at the centre of the EURISLAM project do link state policies towards immigrant integration and cultural differences, to the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims and their descendants, and to the interactions between them and the majority population in the receiving society. What is the theoretical rationale to expect such a link? We build here on theories of *opportunity structures* as they have originally been developed in studies of social movements (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1994, Kriesi et al. 1995). Originally, this research focused primarily on formal institutional structures and the influence these *institutional opportunity structures* have had on social movements. Recently, this research has been further extended to include also *discursive opportunity structures*, i.e. the analysis of trends in the public debate and the acts of collective claims making in the public sphere (Ferree & Gamson 2004).


So far, opportunity structure theories have been fruitfully applied in explaining the strategic behaviour of collective actors such as social movements and political parties. Koopmans et al. (2005) have further applied this approach to the field of immigration and ethnic relations in a comparative analysis of France, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. An important theoretical innovation in our approach is that we propose that *institutional* and *discursive opportunity structures* are also relevant to explain the attitudes and behaviour of individual citizens regarding the perceived cultural distance and interactions between immigrants from Muslim countries and their descendants, and members of national majority in the receiving societies. We define *institutional opportunity structures* as state policies and legal frameworks relating to citizenship, cultural difference, and church-state relations. In our study a total of 38 indicators were used to summarize the relevant institutional arrangements with respect to Muslims (see our separate report on institutional arrangements on the EURISLAM website). To name a few: (1) with respect to **individual rights**: (1a) number of years' residence before naturalization can be requested; (1b) allowance of dual nationality; (1c) automatic attribution or facilitated naturalization for second generation. (2) With respect to **citizenship rights for foreign nationals**: (2a) conditions for family reunification of third country nationals: age limit and integration requirement for spouse; (2b) Conditions for expulsion: criminal convictions for short-term residents; (2c) voting rights for foreigners (excluding EU votes). (3) **Anti-Discrimination rights**: (3a) is incitement to racial hatred included in criminal law; (3b) is discrimination penalized by criminal law (3c) does a State-established antidiscrimination body exist. (4) **Cultural difference**: (4a) Allowance of Islamic ritual slaughter; (4b) allowance of Islamic call to prayer (4c) provision for burial according to Islamic rite: inhumation without coffin. As indicated, these *institutional opportunity structures* were studied in the project's first

research field '**Legislation and Jurisprudence**'. Wherever relevant these opportunity structures will provide a contextual background for cross-national comparison in the remainder of the report.

In addition to formal law and jurisprudence, cultural relations are also affected importantly by how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in relation to these, are framed and contested in the public sphere (that is the public media debate). These questions refer to the concept of *discursive opportunity structure* and address the more informal understandings about culture that resonate in majority-oriented public discourses in the mass media. Questions that relate to the discursive opportunity structure are: who participates in the public debate (governments, Muslim organizations, other societal actors)? What kind of Islam related issues are discussed (for example, radicalization, the right to build a Mosque)? What are the positions of the actors in the public debate with respect to these issues (agree or disagree on the various issues)? Within our theoretical approach a central hypothesis is that institutional and discursive opportunity structures shape the behaviour and attitudes of individuals by institutionally discouraging or sanctioning certain behaviours and tolerating or rewarding others, and by discursively giving public visibility and legitimacy to certain behaviours, opinions and expressions, while marginalizing or stigmatising others.

Figure 1.1a summarizes our theoretical model and how the various research fields are designed to fit in this model. The different arrows indicate a relationship between the macro, meso and micro *levels*, and between different *components* and *actors* within these levels. The thick arrows ABC, represent a downward influence of institutional and discursive structures on the attitudes and behaviour of collective and individual actors. The dotted arrows GHI represent the reverse relationship, namely the upward influence of individual and collective actors on the institutional and discursive structure. The remaining arrows DEF represent the internal relationships between different *components* and *actors* within the separate *levels*. What this figure shows is that the macro-structural context affects *directly* (arrow A) and *indirectly* (arrows B and C) the behaviour and attitudes of Muslims and the national majority in the host society, and thereby also affects the interactions between those two (arrows D). Arrow E and F visualize that institutional and discursive opportunity structures, as well as the behaviour of policy makers and Muslim representatives, mutually influence each other. The dotted arrows G, H, and I, finally, acknowledge that all this is not an one-way street. Through a feedback process, individual attitudes and behaviours may ultimately lead to changes in both institutional and (probably more easily) discursive opportunity structures. Again, individual citizens can either directly or indirectly, via policy makers and organized Muslim representatives, influence the macro-structural context.

Figure 1.1b: Theoretical framework and relation to the research fields



1.1.5 What countries are studied and why?

The EURISLAM project has focused on the six numerically largest destination countries for people originating from predominantly Muslim countries up until the 1980's. In their state of the art report on Muslims in Europe Buijs & Rath (2002) have estimated that these receiving countries are in descending order of magnitude; **France, Germany, The United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland**. In addition to having received relatively many immigrants from countries with a Muslim majority, these countries are further interesting because they have dealt with the influx of immigrants in very different ways (see for example Brubaker 1992, Favell 1998, Koopmans & Statham 1999, Fennema & Tillie 2004, Penninx et al. 2004, Laurence & Vaisse 2006).

For example, **the United Kingdom** and **The Netherlands** have both long been (and to some extent still are) characterized by a multicultural approach to immigrant integration, which is relatively forthcoming towards group demands and to some extent actively promoting the organisation and institutionalisation of immigrant communities along ethnic and racial lines. Compared to **The Netherlands** (Entzinger, 2003), the accent in the British approach (Rex, 1997, Modood et al. 2006) has traditionally been more heavily on equality of socio-economic opportunities and less on cultural issues. These different approaches combine with different traditions of church-state relations in both countries. The Anglican Church and the Church of Scotland enjoy certain exclusive privileges as state churches, whereas the Dutch model of religious pluralism grants funding to a wider base of religious institutions (Lijphart 1984).

Germany and **Switzerland** are examples of countries that have long adhered to more strongly ethnic conceptions of the nation, meaning that it has traditionally been more difficult for immigrant individuals to obtain equal citizenship rights and gain official recognition and support for their cultural distinctiveness. In both countries, immigrants have long been seen primarily as labour hands, and integration efforts therefore focused especially on the labour market (Joppke 1996, Thränhardt 2000, d'Amato 2005). Apart from these similarities, the interaction between the state and religious institutions has been different in **Germany** and **Switzerland**. In **Switzerland**, this interaction leans more towards a French-style form of *laïcité*, which propagates a distinct separation of church and state. In contrast, the German state actively recognizes and supports Christian and Jewish denominations, but does not extend the same privileges to other faith denominations, including Islam.

France is known for its adherence to a republican view on immigrant integration, which entails easy access to equal citizenship rights for immigrants as individuals, but avoidance by the state of official recognition or facilitation of group differences. Integration is viewed primarily as a problem of socio-economic integration, and promoting socio-economic equality is seen as the best way to integrate immigrants culturally. As indicated, the strict separation of church and state under the French notion of *laïcité* dictates religious neutrality in the public domain (Favell 1998, Césari 1997, Leveau et al. 2001, Kastoryano 2006). **Belgium**, finally, combines two different approaches, which draw on the French and the Dutch models described above. In the northern region of Flanders a more multicultural and *pillarized* approach, oriented towards the Dutch model can be observed, while in the southern region of Wallonia, an approach more similar to the French model can be found (Martiniello 2003, Jacobs 2004, Jacobs & Rea 2005).

It should be noted that the trends described above are dominant traditions and approaches in each of our countries studied. These are not set in stone, and have in some cases undergone important changes in recent years (Brubaker 2003, Joppke & Morawska 2003). One example is **Germany**, which overhauled its nationality legislation in 2000 and introduced a form of *jus soli* for immigrant children born in **Germany** (Joppke 2007). Another example is the recent emphasis on linguistic and cultural assimilation in many European countries, including **The Netherlands** and **the UK**, which traditionally had been comparatively forthcoming towards cultural differences (Joppke 2007). Nevertheless, as shall be illustrated in section 1.3, there are persistent differences between our countries under study in the way they deal with immigrants of specific cultural, ethnic or religious groups, on both the level of the individual and the collective.

1.1.6 Which Muslim groups are studied and why?

In addition to countries under study, it is also important to elaborate a little and justify our particular choice of Muslim groups under study. It goes without saying that the Muslims living in Europe can for most purposes not be treated as a homogeneous group. For some European Muslims, different migration backgrounds will play an important role in separating them from other Muslims, but for others, different streams and schools of thought within Islam might be more important than ethnicity or country of origin. Perhaps especially for a domestically born and bred second and third generation and those who convert to Islam without having a Muslim family background, faith and issues of religiosity could easily become more important than ethnic or cultural background. Because we are primarily interested in the study of our six countries as countries of immigration, the EURISLAM research focuses first and foremost on the migration background of resident Muslim minorities.

If we consider all migrants from predominantly Muslim countries that have migrated in significant numbers to our countries of destination, the following seven immigrant groups are available as potential groups under study: Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, Turks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshi, and Muslims from the former Yugoslavia (primarily from Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia). These countries can be clustered in four regions that are linguistically and culturally distinct: the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan and Bangladesh). Including one country from each of these four regions is advantageous, because it could be claimed that cultural attitudes and practices that are ascribed to Islam must in fact be attributed to non-religious cultural factors. Including one case from each region will thus allow us to test whether any differences across immigration countries in patterns of incorporation of Muslim immigrants are stable across these otherwise culturally distinct groups. Table 1.1a shows the number of immigrants from these countries of origin that live in our six destination countries. The OECD figures in the table do not include people of foreign descent born in the destination country who hold the nationality of the country of residence, as is the case for virtually the whole second generation in **the United Kingdom** and **France**, and for a sizeable part of that generation in **Belgium** and **The Netherlands**. The Swiss and German data are affected by this phenomenon to a much lesser extent, because in these countries only a minority of the second generation has obtained citizenship. Thus, the figures presented here should be taken as a rough approximation, which underestimates our population of interest, and does so in some countries more than in others.

Table 1.1c: Immigrants from various source countries in our six destination countries

(Foreign nationals plus nationals born in the respective source country, 1999-2002; x1000)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
<i>Turks</i>	182	1999	59	54	71	179
<i>Moroccans</i>	156	80	9	12	117	710
<i>Algerians</i>	4	17	6	11	15	1247
<i>Tunisians</i>	4	24	6	3	8	341
<i>Pakistanis</i>	11	37	2	321	4	12
<i>Bangladeshi</i>	1	6	1	154	1	2
<i>Ex-Yugoslavs</i>	54	719	273	48	21	78
Source: OECD ¹						

Table 1.1c indicates that the size of these immigrant groups varies strongly across the destination countries. It should be noted that these figures from the OECD table exclude a second generation holding citizenship. For our comparative purposes, we need to choose groups that are present in sufficient numbers in as many countries as possible. This is especially important in view of the opportunity to be able to draw large enough samples in each of the countries. As the table shows, Turkish-origin immigrants are present in sizeable numbers in all six immigration countries. Of the three Maghrebian groups, Moroccans are the most evenly spread across the countries, whereas numbers of Algerians and Tunisians are in some countries so low as to make the drawing of a survey sample practically unfeasible. The two groups from the Indian subcontinent are both spread very unevenly, with a strong concentration in **the United Kingdom**, but Pakistanis are also present in somewhat larger numbers outside **the UK**. The case of Muslims from the former Yugoslavia, finally, is the most difficult, because for this (former) country we only have figures for all immigrants taken together, which will mostly be non-Muslim Serbs, Croats,

¹ DE only foreign nationals (for more detail: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/23/34792376.xls)

and other non-Muslim ethnic groups. Of the population of former Yugoslavia, 17.6% were classified in the country's ethnic statistics as "Muslim". To obtain estimates for the population of ex-Yugoslav Muslims, the figures for all former Yugoslavs in Table 1.1a should therefore approximately be divided by a factor of six. Taking this into account, it seems most feasible to study Turks, Moroccans, Pakistanis, and former Yugoslav Muslims as four groups from distinct cultural and geographic regions of origin.

1.2 How was the EURISLAM research conducted?

1.2.1 Collection and preparation of data in the different research fields

Most work and data gathering has been handled at the national level. A coordinating institute has handled the merging of data and the drafting of integrated reports in each research field. Table 1.2a gives an overview of how the process of data collection was handled and how the EURISLAM consortium members have contributed.

Table 1.2a: Data collection in the research fields

<i>Research fields:</i>	
Research Field 1:	Coordinator: Sciences Po.
'Legislation and Jurisprudence'	Contributing institutions: All
Description of work: a systematic set of cross-national indicators on citizenship and cultural policies has been collected using secondary sources such as policy documents and jurisprudence. Wherever necessary, key informants have been consulted to fill in the gaps. This cross-national indicator set has been developed from, and is based on previous attempts that have more generally attempted to define the legal context facing migrants (Cinar et al 1995, Groenendijk et al. 2001, Guiraudon 2000, Davy 2001, Geddes et al. 2005, Bauböck et al. 2006). The EURISLAM set of indicators focuses in more detail than previous attempts (e.g. Vermeulen 1997, Rath et al. 2001, Koopmans et al. 2005) on aspects of <i>cultural</i> and <i>religious</i> policies and provision. The data collection and analysis in the first research fields has been carried in each country based on strictly cross-nationally comparable guidelines. The systematic information has been gathered and assembled in an integrated dataset allowing for cross-national comparative analyses. A policy brief can be downloaded from the EURISLAM website for more information on the indicators of citizenship.	
Research Field 2:	Coordinator: Laboratoire de Recherches Social et Politiques Appliquées (RESOP)
'Identity Conceptions'	Contributing institutions: All
by a media content analysis Description of work: at the macro level, cultural identity has been studied in a more informal way by means of a content analysis of public debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants. To gather the relevant content data we have followed a two-step procedure that combines the advantages of automated search and selection of online media sources with the qualitative details allowed by human coding. In a first step we have selected several national	

newspapers (all available through online sources such as *LexisNexis*) and sampled from them by making use of relevant keyword searches, (e.g. Islam, Muslim, mosque, imam) which took into account different spellings (e.g. Quran, Qur'ān, Koran, Alcoran or Al-Qur'ān) for each country in the period 1999-2008. Every country selected a maximum of five newspapers on the basis of their own criteria to increase representatives of the sample, which resulted in the selection of the following newspapers: *De Volkskrant*, *Trouw*, *NRC Handelsblad*, *De Telegraaf*, and *Het Parool* in **The Netherlands**; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, *Blick*, *Tagesanzeiger*, *Le Matin*, and *Le Temps* in **Switzerland**; *Bild*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Welt*, and *Tagesspiegel* in **Germany**; *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, *The Guardian*, *The Sun*, and *The Times* in **the UK**; *Het Laatste Nieuws*, *Le Soir*, *Gazet Van Antwerpen*, *La Dernière Heure*, and *De Standaard* in **Belgium**; *Libération*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *La Croix*, and *Le Point* in **France**. The sampling was stratified in each country in order to have an equal proportion of claims from each newspaper.

From the total number of articles retrieved we took a representative sample that has been coded by research assistants. The codebook can be downloaded from the EURISLAM website for more details on the coding process. We have ensured that our analysis will not be focused merely on spectacular and perhaps atypical events. By including the everyday debate about the position of Muslims and Islam in Europe, we attempted to create a sample that gives an honest and variegated view of existing conceptions. At the same time, our period of study also includes intensely debated, conflict-ridden events such as the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the Danish cartoon affair of 2005-2006.

We followed a method of political claims analysis (Koopmans & Statham, 1999) that has proven fruitful in previous work on immigration and ethnic relations politics (Koopmans et al. 2005) as well as in the field of unemployment politics (Giugni & Statham, 2005). In particular, we looked at the *actors* intervening in public debates, the *issues* they address, and the *position* they take in the debate. Similar to the procedure followed for the indicators of citizenship, the systematic data collection and analysis has been carried out in each country based on common guidelines (see appendix). An integrated dataset has been created allowing for cross-national comparative analyses. The results of the media content analysis can be viewed on the EURISLAM website, as well as downloaded in the form of an integrated report (see www.eurislam.eu).

Research Field 3:

Coordinator: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

'Cultural Distance'

Contributing institutions: All

by survey implementation

Description of work: the survey has been designed to capture aspects of individual attitudes and behaviour of cultural interaction with the host society. We have designed our survey in accordance with some of the few existing surveys that have focussed on cultural identification and practices of minorities (e.g. Modood et al 1997, Swyngedouw et al 1999). We build on the insights of such studies to develop a body of relevant questions that focuses on attitudes, norms and values, in particularly those relating to democratic norms, gender relations and family values, ethnic, religious, European and receiving society identification, and on attitudes towards relations across ethnic and religious boundaries. We will further look at cultural and religious resources and practices, such as language proficiency, adherence to various religious practices (e.g., attendance of religious services or wearing of a headscarf), interethnic and interreligious partnerships and marriages, the frequency and quality of interethnic and interreligious relationships with neighbours, friends, and colleagues, and memberships in social and political organisations of the own ethnic and religious group as well as of the receiving society.

Given the fact that statistical categories and possibilities to rely on official registries differ greatly across our countries of study, the most viable method to draw a sample is to use the surname-sampling method, using online telephone directories as a source. Surname-based sampling from phone directories has proven to be an efficient and representative method for the study of immigrant populations (Granato 1999, Humpert & Scheiderheinze 2000, Salentin 1999). To give an example, Berger et al (2004) have used this method to sample people originating from Turkey using name

stems such as Öz or Yil. Like the Turks, the other three groups we intend to study can be identified by typical names or stems of names. Typical names of people of Muslim origin from Bosnia are for instance Ibrahimovic, Begovic, and Kusturica, names from Kosovo indicating Muslim origins include Ibrahimaj and Rugova.

The survey has been conducted using a standard computer assisted telephone interviewing procedure (CATI) with online accessible questionnaires and data storage (using PHPSurveyor). The survey questionnaire was available in both the language of the host society and those of the countries or regions of origin of the respective immigrant groups. The interviewers were bilingual speaking both the language of the host society and the national or regional language of the interviewee, who were given the opportunity to choose the language of preference at the beginning of the interview. The Muslim sample was constituted by making use of the following procedure: first, through an *onomastic* method (name recognition method), a sampling frame was constituted making use of digital phone book records (including both land lines as cellular phones), aimed at identifying people of Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani and Ex-Yugoslav origin. Subsequently these people were phoned up by a polling agency in each country and screened whether they had indeed the aforementioned national origins and were themselves Muslims or of Muslim descent.

All consortium members were involved in the preparation of the questionnaire in which particular attention has been given to the issue of cross-cultural validity (Jowell et al, 2007). Data was collected by polling agencies and cleaned and integrated into a common database by ULB with assistance of IMES.

Research Field 4: **Coordinator:** Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

‘Cross-National Socio-Cultural Variables’ **Contributing institutions:** Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES)
by a survey analysis

Description of work: subsequent to the phase of survey design and data collection, univariate and multivariate statistical analyses have been used to explore the data in preparation for the making of this report and forthcoming publications. Preliminary analysis was conducted using standard statistical methods, mainly cross-tabulations and regression analysis.

This analysis provides a first attempt to identify any cross-national differences on key cultural variables (Research Field 3) that persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration, and to what extent these cross-national differences are stable across Muslim groups from various countries of origin, or whether there are specific interaction effects between destination and source countries of immigration. In addition, the preliminary analysis of the survey data was conducted to address the relationship between cultural and socio-economic integration for these specific groups, which has been a topic of much public and policy debate in recent times.

Survey data has been cleaned, merged and analysed by ULB with some assistance of IMES. An integrated report presenting a long list of tables with univariate and multivariate analyses can be downloaded from the EURISLAM website.

Research Field 5: **Coordinator:** University of Bristol (UNIBRS)

‘Transnational families’ **Contributing institutions:** Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES), University of Bristol (UNIBRS), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
by conducting qualitative interviews

Description of work: opinions and attitudes are not only significant quantitatively in an aggregated sense, but also qualitatively in the way that individual members of specific groups interpret, understand and experience specific topics, and this is why we wanted to introduce a quasi-experimental group interview method within the project. Our aim has been to interview migrant families that have members (first degree of blood relatives) living in at least three different countries

participating in the project, and allow them to compare their experiences by focusing on specific topics in relation to issues also covered by our survey, as well as in research fields 1 and 2.

We have chosen to send an interviewer into the field and interview the family members separately in the different countries. Families were found using the existing networks of our researchers and through snowball sampling. The three institutes involved (IMES, UNIVBRIS, and WZB) each focussed on the group of Muslim immigrants that is most numerous in their respective countries (i.e. Turks in **Germany**, Pakistani in **The United Kingdom** and Moroccans in **The Netherlands**) A common set of semi-structured interview questions used in all interviews was prepared by the University of Bristol.

Research Field 6:

Coordinator: Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES)

‘Representatives Muslim Organisations’

Contributing institutions: All

by semi-structured interviews

Description of work: through a series of semi-structured interviews we have gathered information on the position of a variety of Muslim community leaders who publicly represent their communities in the society of settlement. We have considered both leaders of religious organisations and those of organisations which mobilise using ‘Muslim’ as a label for an ‘ethnic’ group, and/or ‘homeland’ labels (e.g. ‘Turkish’), which may be more secular in their political orientation. This has allowed us to look a bit closer at variations in different community leaderships’ views of strategies for cultural interaction and whether community elite positions vary significantly from those held by their communities according to the survey responses.

In each country we have selected between 15-20 important organisations that claim to represent the different groups of the EURISLAM project. The intention was that in each country for those ethnic groups that are most numerous, six interviews with Muslim leaders representing those communities would be arranged. For the smaller ethnic groups only four interviews would be held. For instance, in **The Netherlands**, Turkish and Moroccan communities are much more sizable than the Pakistani and Yugoslavian communities, so for the first two groups the target was to interview six representatives and for Pakistani and Yugoslavs four. Furthermore, the intention was to find some relatively conservative, some moderate and some relatively liberal leaders in every community, to maximize the variation among the interviewees.

A common set of questions and topics has been developed that will allow for cross-national pooling of insights, information and comparative analysis. The interviews were carried face-to-face on the basis of a common interview grid prepared jointly by all the partners. The questionnaire consists of five subject blocks containing information on basic information on the organisation, the network and contact of the organisation, religious practices, how leaders cope with the media and the ongoing debate on Muslims and Islam, and what leaders think are the most difficult issues that divide their ethnic community from the majority society. Each consortium member was responsible for conducting the interview in their respective country and supplying the material to IMES for merging and analysis. A final integrated report including the full questionnaire can be downloaded from the EURISLAM website.

1.2.2 Realised samples and notes on data quality

Before we move to the outline of the final report we shall briefly introduce the different sets of data and talk a little about the realised samples, problems in data collection, and the overall quality of the data. Table 1.2b gives a general overview of the project’s different datasets. Data collected for the first research field ‘**Legislation and Jurisprudence**’ are omitted because this dataset does not consist of a random population sample, but is rather

a quantified cross-national set of predefined policy indicators measured at four different time points.

Media content analysis: The units of analysis in the media content analysis are instances of claim-making. An instance of claim-making (shorthand: a claim) is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action; regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc.). Decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely the ones that have a direct effect on the objects of the claim. Our definition of claim-making implies two important delimitations that require some elaboration:

- (1) To qualify as an instance of claim-making, the text had to include a reference to an ongoing or concluded physical or verbal action in the public sphere, i.e. simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors did not count as claim-making (see EURISLAM RF2 codebook). Verbs indicating action included, e.g., said, stated, demanded, criticised, decided, demonstrated, published, voted, wrote, arrested. Nouns directly referring to such action included, e.g., statement, letter, speech, report, blockade, deportation, decision. The occurrence in the newspaper report of such verbs or nouns was a precondition for the coding of a claim. Reports that only referred to “states of mind” or motivations were not coded.
- (2) Collected claims had to be “political,” in the sense that they had to relate to collective social problems and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems.

Table 1.2b: General overview of EURISLAM data

<i>EURISLAM data</i>		NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR	Total
Media content analysis	1999	23	26	45	17	10	5	126
	2000	42	21	37	22	17	12	151
	2001	105	70	62	94	47	37	415
	2002	72	60	71	97	113	45	458
	2003	78	89	85	108	76	86	522
	2004	187	100	156	163	119	153	878
	2005	125	65	83	172	104	67	616
	2006	97	149	126	192	146	62	772
	2007	80	115	84	165	97	30	571
	2008	81	89	41	143	83	54	491
Total		890	784	790	1173	812	551	5000
Survey data	Nat. Majority	385	390	383	387	386	383	2314
	Turks	151	256	249	150	153	150	1109
	Moroccans	250	253	253	250	256	250	1512
	Pakistani	250	256	147	148	255	257	1313
	Ex-Yugoslav	152	162	152	250	147	145	1008
	Total	1188	1317	1184	1185	1197	1185	7256
Interview data <i>Interviews with transnational family members between parentheses</i>	Turks	4	4	5	1	6	2	22
	Moroccans	5	3	3	0	6	0	17
	Pakistani	1	4	3	3	1	1	13
	Ex-Yugoslav	2	2	4	0	1	0	9

Other	1	5	5	15	0	3	29
Total	14	18	20	19	14	6	91

To be included, a claim must either be made in one of our countries of coding or be addressed at an actor or institution in one of our countries of coding. Claims are also included if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which the country of coding is a member, on the condition that the claim is also relevant for the country of coding. Claims were coded on the condition that they did not occur more than two weeks before the date of appearance of the article, and only if they have not been coded previously. If the date of a claim is not specifically mentioned in the article, for example stating that something happened recently, the day prior to the newspaper issue is taken as the default.

Overall more than 5000 instances of claim-making have been coded in our six countries over a period of 10 years. The spread of coded claims varies through the years and the countries with noticeable fewer claims coded in **France** and overall fewer claims coded prior to 2001. Coding has been done by 13 different coders. Reliability tests have been performed in order to check the consistency of coding across the different coders. These tests yield a strong consistency both with regard to the selection of claims and their description². This means that coders were reasonable consistent in selecting which articles to code and how to code them.

Survey data: Table 1.2b provides information about the realised sample sizes in the different countries and for the different groups. In total 7256 people were interviewed: 1188 in **The Netherlands** (NL), 1317 in **Germany** (DE), 1184 in **Switzerland** (CH), 1185 in **the United Kingdom** (UK), 1197 in **Belgium** (BE) and 1185 in **France** (FR). In each country we had the aim of interviewing 385 members of the national majority group (predominantly non-Muslims) and 250 or 150 Muslims of each of the ethnic minority groups. In countries where this ethnic minority group is sizeable, 250 people were interviewed, and if it concerns a small group the sample was limited to 150 people. The aim was to strike a balance between cost-effectiveness, minimal sample size requirements and gathering enough information on all ethnic groups in our six participating countries.

We can note that the rates of successful phone calls leading to a useable interview are overall low. As an example, the success rate of phone interviewing in **Belgium** was highest among the Turkish group (20,5%) and the national majority control group (19,8%), followed by the ex-Yugoslav group (15,6%). Among Moroccans and the Pakistani groups the success rate was much lower, 11,4% and 7,3% respectively. For the Pakistani group this is mainly due to the large number of non-useable phone numbers, while for the Moroccan group this is mainly due to refusal rate. If we calculate the response rate on the basis of successful contacts with people falling within the population sample frames (i.e. eligible contacts), the response rates are 45,1% for the national majority group in **Belgium**, 32,7% for the ex-Yugoslav group, 27,6% for the Moroccan origin group, 24% for the Pakistani origin group and 36,8% for the Turkish origin group. Those people who refused were asked a follow up question why they refused and almost all of them noted they either had no time or where not interested.

²The Chronbach alpha for selection bias (computed on a sample of 15 articles) is 0.905. The Chronbach alpha for description bias (computed on a sample of 4 articles) is, respectively, 0.973, 0.976, 0.975, and 0.983, for an average of 0.979.

Due to high costs a dressed down version of the questionnaire was used in **France** and **The Netherlands**, and not all variables are therefore comparable over the six countries. In addition, an error found in the questionnaire used for interviewing in **the United Kingdom** is likely to cause a bias in the response to some questions. In questions pertaining to national identity and identification an error was made in asking the interviewee to what degree they felt or identified with being English. This is likely to cause a bias in the answering because English is a very specific identity that should have been replaced in the questionnaire with the more neutral British identity. Another strange observation in the British survey data is that the Muslim groups seems to consist of only religious Muslims, i.e. all respondents with a Muslim background in the UK, i.e. immigrants from Muslim countries and their offspring, claim to identify not only culturally but also religiously with Islam. All these issues infringe on the overall quality of the survey data. Therefore notice will be given to these points wherever they come up in the rest of the report, so they will not mislead or cause confusion for the reader.

Interview data: Most of the fieldwork took place between April and September 2011, with some delayed interviews in the months afterwards. In **The Netherlands, Germany** and **France** the researchers were helped by two to four interviewers, while in **Switzerland, the UK** and **Belgium** one researcher performed all the interviews. In some countries it turned out difficult to convince interviewees to take part. There were a few reasons for this. Some of the potential respondents that we approached had already given so many interviews that they suffered from research fatigue. In others cases the subject caused the problem: they did not like it that they were approached because of their religious group, and sometimes because of their ethnic group. A third reason was mistrust; some potential interviewees thought that anything they would say would be abused in the current debate on Muslims. The researchers had to do considerable effort to convince them. In some occasions the interviewer met with a single member of the organisation and sometimes there was a small group of board members present to represent the association. The interviews took place at mosques, at the buildings of federations, but also in the workplace or the homes of respondents. During the interview the interviewer put answers in the questionnaire and made notes. In some cases a recorder was used. After the interview was successfully finished, the interviewer or assistant transferred the results into an English questionnaire. In some cases the interview report was immediately written in English, while in other cases the report was first made up in German, Dutch or French to let the interviewee read it and agree with it, and then translated into English. In some cases the questionnaire format was not used during the interview, but the data were afterwards transferred into the questionnaire.

As Table 1.2b shows, the total number of interviews per country varies from 20 in **Switzerland** to only 6 in **France**. The table further shows that not all interviewers have interviewed six representatives of the largest communities in that country. Only in **Belgium**, six Turkish and six Moroccans leaders were interviewed. There are substantial gaps across the other countries and communities. In the UK where the Pakistani community is by far the largest, only two representatives of Pakistani organisations were interviewed, while 15 interviewees were not representing any of the targeted communities. In **France** there is an even more general lack of interview material with only six interviews completed. But since the total number of interviews is relatively large and all the columns are reasonably filled, we'll still be able to draw some conclusions on the differences between ethnic groups. A second problem, which had to be taken into account during our analyses, was the fact that some interviews did not include all block of questions, due to time constraints during the interview or respondents refusing to answer the questions. All these issues should be taken into account when making any cross-national comparison, and we will address these issues in the remainder of the report wherever they are relevant.

1.3 Outline of the report

As indicated, the outline of the report will follow a slightly different logic than the subdivision of research fields in the overall design of the project. This was done to provide the reader with a more integrated analysis that follows single topics through different stages of the project. We hope that this will make it easier to tackle single issues at different levels of analysis as laid out in the project's theoretical model in section 1.1.4 and figure 1.1a. Table 1.3a briefly summarises the content of each chapter, focussing on which questions are handled and which research fields are involved in finding answers to these questions.

Table 1.3a Report outline

<i>Chapters of the report</i>	<i>Content</i>
2: Identity	How do Muslims define themselves and how does the national majority define these groups. We will take data from the survey on issues of identity and identification and compare this to the informal discursive atmosphere in each country taken from the media content analysis. Furthermore, we will look at elements of identity as stressed by the leaders and representatives of the different groups, as well as by the transnational families.
3: Religious Practices	To what extent are religious practices officially supported in the six countries? We will look at the institutional opportunity structures for religious practices taken from the indicators of citizenship in the project's research field ' Legislation and Jurisprudence '. Secondly, what do Muslims themselves think about their religious practices? What do they think is most important, and what types of religious behaviour to they themselves report? For this we again take data from the survey and compare this to positions taken by the leaders and representative of Muslim organisations in the interviews. Finally, we will look at the issues which are considered to be the most contentions and controversial in the public debate by analysing the data of the media content analysis.
4: Dividing Issues	How well do Muslim respondents speak the national language in the different countries? What do Muslim respondents see as dividing issues between themselves and the national majority of the country they live in? We look at these issues using survey data and interview data and compare these with subjects that turn up in the public debate. We will look at patterns of cultural distance measured in attitudes towards democracy, male-female relations, freedom of speech, and the role of religion in society.
5: Coping with Media	What can we say about the tone and actors in the public debate when we compare data from the media content analysis across our six countries? Is there any evidence in the survey data that these factors could have an effect on the

resident Muslim groups? And how do the leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations in the interviews indicate that they cope with and react to the media climate in their country?

6: Contact & Networks

What contact is there between Muslim groups and the national majority in the several countries and what intra- or inter-religious networks exist between Muslim organisations and other faith based organisations? Here we will primarily use survey data and supplement this with data from the interviews on intra- and inter-religious cooperation between the organisations.

7: Explaining the Social-Cultural Integration of Muslims in Europe

In this chapter we will try to take a first step in explaining the social-cultural integration of European Muslims. In the analyses we wish to establish to what extent cross-national differences on our various socio-cultural variables persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. Moreover, these analyses can establish to what extent these cross-national differences are stable across Muslim groups from various countries of origin. The data will also be used to analyse the issue of the relation between cultural and socio-economic integration.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations for Policy Implementation

The main findings of the EURISLAM project are connected to some important recommendations for policy implementation.

2. Ethnic and religious identity

This chapter deals with the ethnic and religious identification of the four Muslim groups in our study. Ethnic identity is a complex concept. According to an often cited author in this field, the British psychologist Jean S. Phinney, the concept refers to claims of a common ancestry. One shares at least a similar culture, race, religion, language, kinship, or place of origin within the context of a group (Phinney, 2003). She maintains, that, “ethnic identity is a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity, or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group” (2003: p. 63).

Ethnic identity becomes more relevant in the migration context, because immigrants usually migrate to a country where they are a minority. Native inhabitants of countries with only one national group tend to think less about their ethnic identity than those in countries where more than one ethnic group resides, since in the latter case there is more reason to think about the specific characteristics of one’s own ethnic group. What differentiates them? Is it culture, language, or the experiences people have gone through that make them different? Immigrants can choose to define themselves mainly in terms of their country of origin, in terms of the country of settlement, or in a combination of both. What is deemed most important will depend on a lot of different factors.

Ethnic identities are defined in relation to others. Decisions how to define oneself are made by individuals, but strongly influenced by the opinions of those whom people consider part of their ‘own’ group - the in-group - and those whom they think are members of the out-group. The ethnic and religious identities of a person are some of the many social identities with which people define themselves in relation to their chosen group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Boundary setting is part of determining where the difference between ones in-group and the out-group lies, as stated in one of the classics in the field, Frederik Barths ‘Ethnic groups and boundaries’ (1969).

As most authors on this subject agree on, ethnic identity formation is a dynamic process; the subjective belief of being part of a certain group with a reasoning about the common origin, descent and history is determined by wider social and material circumstances, cultural meanings and historical conditions (Verkuyten, 2005: 80). Just like identity in general, ethnic identity should not be considered as a stable characteristic, since it gets redefined when circumstances change. For instance a Moroccan immigrant in **The Netherlands** can arrive as a not very religious young man, interested in work and the adventure of moving to a new country, but after having lived for 30 years in the new context, he might become more aware of his Moroccan and Muslim roots.

The way people see themselves is on the one hand determined by views they develop themselves and the views given by other members of their group. On the other hand, identity is also formed by positive and negative views of out-group members. In the migration context stigmatisation of newcomers is rather common. Cultural differences are easily considered negatively and can sometimes even be felt as threatening by the host society.

In some cases cultural and religious elements are intertwined or may fight for prioritisation. This could also be the case for the Muslim groups in this study. The question becomes relevant to what extent they are identified as a national group or as a religious group (for instance Muslims), or even as a religious sub denomination (for instance Alevi’s). In the

case of Muslims in Western Europe stigmatisation seems to have increased in the last ten years (Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002; Saeed, 2007). Consequently, the attention of the ethnic groups in this study might have shifted into putting more emphasis on the religious aspect of their belonging – related to a more defensive attitude to defend their faith than was felt necessary in their country of origin or in the 1960's.

A last relevant issue is that the actual acceptance of immigrants by the host society might not be the same as the acceptance that immigrants perceive. A lack of perceived acceptance might lead to negative feelings and frustrations. In some cases the negative image of the out-group becomes so important that it gets internalised. This is a phenomenon that has been described for African Americans and colonial minorities. If this process has also become relevant for Muslims, still remains an important question.

In this chapter we will pay attention to both the actual acceptance as reported by members of the receiving society and the perceived acceptance as reported by immigrants. We will discuss the way our four Muslim groups define themselves and the way they are defined by others. We will divide the results into issues around self-identification and definitions by others (Van Heelsum, 1997). In section 2.1 we will present survey data to describe how individuals in the six countries define themselves in ethnic and religious terms. In section 2.2 we will use interview data to describe which aspects of identity are stressed by the community leaders. The following two sections are concerned with definitions by others. In 2.3 we will describe how the national majority in the countries of our study define the Muslim groupings in the study and to what extent they accept them. This section is again based on data from our survey, but now concerns the answers of the majority population. Perceived acceptance by immigrants is also part of this chapter as is the perception of members of our transnational families with respect to their sense of belonging. In 2.4 we will describe which aspects of the identity of the groups in the study are stressed in the media. Finally in 2.5 we will compare the four types of data.

2.1 Ethnic and religious self-identification of Muslim respondents

As we explained, self-identification of Muslim respondents in our survey has several elements that play at the same time: at least the country of origin element, the country of settlement element and the religious element. Therefore we asked three questions in the survey; 1) 'to what extent do you see yourself as a member of the Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani or Ex-Yugoslavian community'; 2) 'to what extent do you identify with The Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, UK, Belgium or France', and; 3) 'to what extent do you see yourself as Muslim?'

The first subject is the identification with the country of origin. In table 2.1 the added scores are presented of those who strong and very strongly agree with the statement; 'to what extent do you see yourself as a member of the your ethnic community?' (very strongly, strongly, somewhat, hardly, not at all). The countries are ranked in descending order after adding up the identification scores for all groups in that country.

Figure 2.1 Identification with the country of origin (% strongly + very strongly agree on the question: to what extent do you see yourself as a member of the community of your country of origin)





Figure 2.1 shows that Turkish migrants tend to have the highest scores in **the UK, Belgium, Germany** and **The Netherlands**, which means that they identify most with their country of origin. In **France** and **Switzerland**, Moroccans show the highest identification with their country of origin. In general Pakistanis and ex-Yugoslavs seem to identify slightly less with their community of their country of origin than Turks and Moroccans.

When comparing the countries there seems to be no systematic differences. Turks identify most with their country of origin in **the UK** (96.8 per cent), but this is not a systematic feature of **the UK** because Pakistanis feel most connected to their country of origin in **France**. Pakistanis identify least with their country of origin in **The Netherlands** (50.8 per cent lowest score in the table) but this is again not a systematic trade of The Netherlands since German Moroccans identify less with Morocco.

The second element of self-definition is the identification with the country of settlement. In figure 2.2 the combined scores of those who identify strongly and very strongly with the country of settlement are presented. We have added the scores of the national minority for comparison. The countries are ranked in descending order after calculating a total score for identification with the country of settlement not including the national majority. We see both rather high and rather low scores. As expected, the national majority scores higher than the migrants, but it should be noted that not all autochthonous respondents identify strongly or very strongly with the country where they live in (maximum 85.6 per cent in the UK).


Figure 2.2 Identification with the country of settlement (% strongly + very strongly on the question: to what extent do you see yourself as Dutch, German, Swiss, British, Belgian or French?)



As the figure shows, the identification of migrants with their country of settlement varies considerably across countries and groups. Turks have systematically lower scores. For the rest there seems to be no clear pattern in the scores, neither based on ethnic groups, nor on countries. Pakistanis tend to have high scores, but strange enough not in **the UK**, where the majority of Pakistanis in Europe resides. This issue has to be explored in future publications. Dutch Pakistanis have the highest score in all cells, meaning they identify most as Dutch (68.2 per cent). Turks tend to identify less with the country of settlement, but in **The Netherlands** we find a considerably higher score than in the other countries. The lowest score of all cells is the one of the German Turks, meaning they identify least with **Germany** (11.2 per cent). Comparing the countries, **The Netherlands** seems to do relatively well.

The third element of self-definition is the religious identification. In figure 2.3 the combined scores of those who see themselves strong or very strongly as Muslims are presented (we selected only the Muslim respondents).

Figure 2.3 Level of religious identification by ethnic group and country (% strongly + very strongly agree on the question: to what extent do you see yourself as a Muslim?)



The total length of the rows in the table indicate the mean scores for the ethnic groups, so we can conclude that Pakistanis show the strongest identification as Muslims, Moroccans second, Turks third, and ex-Yugoslavs identify much less as Muslims than the other groups.

When taking the scores per ethnic group and per country into account, the highest Muslim identification score in the figure shows for Pakistanis in the UK (92 per cent), meaning they identify strongest as Muslims compared to any of the other groups in any of the countries. However Pakistanis are not in all countries so eager to identify as Muslims, much less for example in **The Netherlands**.

The lowest level of identification as Muslim per ethnic group and per country in the table is found among ex-Yugoslavs in **the UK** and **The Netherlands** (33 per cent). As already mentioned this is a general characteristic for the ex-Yugoslavs.

Not a single country stands out in which the ethnic groups systematically identify more as Muslims. Pakistanis identify more strongly as Muslims in **the UK**, Moroccans in **The Netherlands**, France and the UK, Turks most in Belgium and ex-Yugoslavs also most in Belgium. This might indicate a tendency to identify more strongly as Muslims in a country where the group is relatively numerous.

Summarising, the three measures of self-identification point in the direction of differences between ethnic groups, and not in the direction of differences between countries. But the type of self-identification per ethnic group differs. Turks tend to have higher scores on identification with the countries of origin and lower scores on the identification with the country of settlement than the others. Pakistanis show a stronger tendency for religious identification as Muslims, and ex-Yugoslavs have this much less than the others.

2.2 Views of Muslim leaders on the identity of their organisations

Community representatives have a different role and position than the general public, since they might like to stress a certain image of their community or they might be more involved with the debate on Muslims/ethnic groups than the public. We interviewed 91

representatives of organisations that were selected because the majority of the board is Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani or Ex-Yugoslavian or because they work mainly for these communities, so not particularly religious organisations. In the six countries of our study, it is possible to see how these representatives present the identity of the organisation in the study. In this case the data collection had a qualitative nature and therefore we used open questions, namely: 'How would you present the organisation to the outside world?' We coded the answers afterwards. This led to a categorisation into three main categories: a) mainly in religious terms either Muslim or another religion, b) mainly in non-religious terms, namely as a migrant-, political- or secular organisation and c) in terms of country of settlement or ethnic identity (country of origin).

For a cross tabulation of ethnic groups and country of settlement the numbers in the cells were too low. Therefore we first present the results per ethnic group and then per country. In table 2.4 the answers per ethnic group are presented.

Table 2.1: Leaders definition of the organisations identity by ethnic group in absolute numbers (multiple responses)

Main category	Subcategory	None /Multi	Moroccan	Pakistani	Turkish	Ex-Yugoslav
<i>Religious identity</i>	Muslim / Islam	19	14	7	13	8
	Other	1	.	.	4	.
<i>Non-religious identity</i>	Migrant organisation	.	1	1	.	.
	Political	1	.	.	.	.
	Secular	3	1	.	1	.
<i>[Inter] cultural, national, or ethnic identity</i>	[Inter]cultural	3	1	.	4	.
	BE/CH/DE/FR/NL/UK	2	3	.	.	.
	Tu/Mo/Pa/Yu	.	.	5	5	3
<i>Total number of organisations</i>		26	17	13	23	9

Table 2.1 shows that across different ethnic groups a religious identity as an Islamic or Muslim organisation is by far the largest category. This is the case for all ethnic groups. The exceptions that occur more than 4 times are Pakistanis and Turks who (in five cases) identify their organisations along ethno-cultural lines, whereas Moroccan organisations in our sample appear to stay clear of such explicit classification. The column of non-specific and multi-ethnic organisations occurs mainly in **the UK**, but this was due to a slightly different sampling method, so this is not a result as such. No Turkish, Pakistani or Ex-Yugoslavian organisation identified in relation to the country of settlement. Except for two non-specific and multi-ethnic organisations, three Moroccan leaders explicitly expressed their organisational identity to be tied to the country of residence:

‘We are a Dutch organisation; we are not at all a Moroccan organisation. Only to make it easier for people, we [say we] are a Moroccan organisation. For me that is not correct. We are a Dutch organisation. But we represent the Dutch of Moroccan descent’ (“Moroccan” organisation, **The Netherlands**).

Table 2.2 shows the results per country. Across the countries, the religious identity as an Islamic or Muslim organisation is again the largest category. In general this is the only category that the leaders choose, except six leaders in **Germany** who identify their organisation as an ethnic organisation. Only in **The Netherlands** and **Germany**, five organisations identify as German or Dutch: three (out of 18) in Germany and two (out of 14) in **The Netherlands**. In conclusion: for the leaders of organisations the most important form of identification is the religious identity as a Muslim or Islamic organisation. Some organisations in **Germany** and **The Netherlands** identify with their ethnic background (e.g. Turkish, Moroccan) and with the identity of the host country. Organisations of Moroccans seem most reluctant to identify explicitly with their ethnic background.

Table 2.2 Leaders definition of the organisations identity by country in numbers (multiple responses)

Main category	Subcategory	BE	DE	NL	CH	UK
<i>Religious identity</i>	Muslim / Islam	12	13	9	15	14
	Other	1	1	1	1	1
<i>Non-religious identity</i>	Migrant organisation	.	1	.	.	1
	Political	.	.	.	.	1
	Secular	.	.	1	1	1
<i>[Inter] cultural, national, or ethnic identity</i>	[Inter]cultural	1	1	2	2	1
	BE/CH/DE/FR/NL/UK	.	3	2	.	.
	Tu/Mo/Pa/Yu	1	6	3	1	.
<i>Total number of organisations</i>		14	18	14	20	18

2.3 How are immigrants seen by the majority and to what extent do they feel accepted?

After having seen how the ethnic groups in our study define themselves, we will now turn to the way they are seen by the majority and in the media. Firstly we look at the actual acceptance by majority group members based on our survey, and then at the perceived acceptance by immigrants themselves, also based on our survey. Here we also add results of our interviews with Transnational Family members with respect to their feelings of belonging in the country of residence. As stated earlier, the British team undertook Pakistani transnational families, the German team Turkish transnational families, and the

Dutch Moroccan transnational families. Regarding outcomes, the British team undertook interviews with 3 families, but with a special emphasis on one large transnational family. The Dutch team produced coverage of one large family. Both of these teams conducted mainly interviews with individuals. The German team covered two families, again with one on more detail, and was able to implement group discussions (see our report on this research field on the EURISLAM website).


In the survey we have asked respondents of the national majority to what extent they see immigrants who permanently live in for instance **The Netherlands**, as Dutch. The questions were asked about the total category of immigrants and not for every ethnic group separately.

The replies given by the autochthonous respondents in the six countries vary significantly, with respondents in the **United Kingdom** showing least acceptance of immigrants, and French showing most acceptance. This is visible when comparing the first bars in figure 2.4, presenting the results on the question to the national majority. The dotted line indicates the difference between positive and negative answers. In **the UK** the answers are more often below the dotted line, thus negative, while in **France** the results are more often above the dotted line than in other countries, thus positive.

The results concerning **the UK** may have been influenced by an unintended effect caused by the phrasing of the question. The question ‘to what extent do English people see you as English’, might have another effect as ‘to what extent do British people see you as a British man or woman’. With that in mind, we might get less alarmed by the low British score, and just consider the less big differences between **Germany**, **Belgium** on the low side, **Switzerland** in the middle and **The Netherlands** on the high side.

In figure 2.4 we have put the answers of two questions together, namely to the question on acceptance by the national majority and to the question on the perceived acceptance that immigrant groups observe. The second to the fifth bar in every country shows the perceived acceptance per ethnic group in that country. Again **the UK** stands out with the lowest perceived acceptance level, for three ethnic groups. The answers are more often considerably below the dotted line, thus negative. This might be influenced by the same problem we noticed earlier, namely that English does not have the same connotation as British, though it is a bit surprising that the largest immigrant group, the Pakistani one, has a much more positive idea about their acceptance than the others. In general the ethnic group that seems to feel least accepted (scores below the dotted line) are the Turks. The highest scores on perceived acceptance are found among Ex-Yugoslavs: they feel most accepted.

Figure 2.4 Acceptance by national majority (first bar) and feelings of acceptance of Muslim immigrants as fellow citizens (second to fifth bars).



How did the members of our transnational families perceive their sense of belonging? The answer is mixed. When discussing 'belonging', our respondents expressed many contradictory and ambivalent positions, in relation to both the homeland and country of residence:

AJ (member of a Pakistani transnational family) said he did not belong in Pakistan, he belonged in Belgium stating 'I have made it my home'. AJ also recognized the contradictions within him saying things like 'I never felt Belgian in terms of the way of living, I can't cope with that'. (Pakistani male, 48 years, resident Belgium)

SA did not feel Belgian or Pakistani. She said she had been schooled in Belgium like the Christians and at home she was a Pakistani with all the culture and traditions of Pakistan and Islam. She shared conflict and difficulty in the stories of the Holy Books ie story of Moses in Bible versus the Quranic version. She spoke of not speaking to boys and the boundaries culture imposes ending with, 'we're mixed'. (Pakistani female, 24 years, resident Belgium)

Overall, respondents described their sense of belonging to be related mainly to their social networks and the lifestyle choices they had been socialized into:

BM emphatically believed he belonged in Belgium. He said, 'My friends are here, I play sports here which I really enjoy – they don't have this sport in other countries'. It was a sport played mainly in Belgium. He said he didn't feel good in Pakistan, the community was tight. (Pakistani male, 18 years, resident Belgium)

I find it very difficult to say where I belong. My home is the Netherlands. I get homesick whenever I have spent a few weeks in Morocco. I depend very much on the Netherlands. I don't leave the country without a kilo of cheese on me. I am very used to my privacy. I don't like the social control in Morocco. I don't like to take everybody's needs in consideration. And I don't feel like adapting to everybody else's priorities. (Moroccan female, 35 years, resident Netherlands)

One aspect that did seem to matter in expressing belonging concerned reference to practising and being active within cultural events of the community. This seemed to make belonging more contextual in an attempt to deal with the above mentioned ambivalence. In this respect cultural and religious practises were considered important as an anchor for the family identity:

When I feel Moroccan in Belgium? When we have our rituals, like Ramadan or when we celebrate a wedding or some other important festivity. Then you feel you are passing through your culture to your children. I find that very important. My children have to know what it means to be Moroccan, what it means to be Muslim. (Moroccan female, 39 years, resident Belgium)

Respondents were able to negotiate different layers of identity, in a multiple way. There did not seem to be a zero-sum relationship between different identities. The family unit was probably most important, but so was the local place of residence, and so was being a Muslim:

The whole family is very much attached to this place. It's practical. Whenever I am working I can leave the children at my parents or siblings. I didn't have to pay for the day-nursery. It's much easier. I could have left the city, but life would have been much more difficult for me. It has a very practical side, but I also have lots of emotional ties to the city. I practically know everyone in

Roubaix, which gives you the feeling of being at home. (Moroccan female, 48 years, resident France)

I suddenly realized that I was Moroccan, that I was a Muslim. I suddenly felt less inclined to behave integrated, I felt as if I didn't want to belong to a country that did not accept me for who I am. I have rights too. If you don't want me, I don't want you either. If you say I am Moroccan, I will be Moroccan, and will be proud of it. I won't feel ashamed because society wants me to. I had always had the feeling that I was Dutch, but from then on I decided that I didn't want to prove myself. We all integrated naturally and suddenly the Netherlands wanted me to prove that I really was integrated - this made me rebellious. (Moroccan female, 42 years, resident France)

As we can see from the last quote, politics and media in the society of settlement can have a sizeable impact on the sense of identity. In this sense, perceived stigmatization of Muslims within certain countries of settlement, and racism and discrimination, appears to have had an effect in changing perceptions of life chances and resultant locations:

I never had the feeling that living in the Netherlands was problematic, until the shit hit the fan some years ago. It all began in 2000 or 2001. I think it all started with 9/11, the reactions to that were enormous. Suddenly being a Moroccan Dutch became a problem. Then came Pim Fortuyn and things got even worse from then on. As I said earlier, I had always been proud of being Dutch. I thought the Netherlands were different, although of course I realized that there were racists and everything wasn't honky dory, it was still a lot better than elsewhere. Some things were unimaginable, you couldn't imagine that the things that are said nowadays were to be said. There was discrimination, but it wasn't out in the open. And whenever something racist was said, it was frowned upon. (Moroccan female, 42 years, resident France)

In Germany I always say, I don't like the politics I always say. What ehm there are so many uncertainties if one has so many things, experiences so let's say against foreigners or if one listens to the statistics in the medias ehm not being accepted and that creates uncertainty among us. But in general and if I see you here, you are I know how you look at me. How you think of me as a foreigner or Michi (anonym) my colleague or eh Mr. ((Miller- anonym)) or me my wife and so on. There I feel comfortable. There is a general, like not welcome, such a big percentage. I mean I am reading/following the media reports so like thirty-five forty-five percent, those are not a few among the population that Muslims or Turks return to their home country. There are also some actively against eh for example those murders (Turkish male, resident Germany).

Factors that were important in generating positive associations with a society of settlement included the local environment and particularly the density of same ethnic group Muslims within that town. Here the weight of numbers and institutional visible presence of Islam, locally, were seen to counterbalance nationally held policies, as the following quote shows with reference to laïcité in France.

I feel most at home in France. I think you can easily be a practising Muslim everywhere in Europe. Even within secular France. Here in Roubaix we have five mosques. We have halal meat, halal supermarkets. The veil isn't a problem. The youngsters play the game. They enter school with their veil, take it off and go to class and do the opposite when school ends. So, no real problems there. (Moroccan male, 52 years, resident France)

The importance of regional differences of experiences were also cited by Pakistanis, and in this case, local experiences in cultural monist France, could be seen as better than some local experiences in multicultural Belgium:

The family are all very close and SN also felt they had become insular because of the nature of Belgium's lack of knowledge around Muslims – she spoke of issues such as clothes worn and Belgium's view of Muslims. SN felt that if the Belgian branch of the family moved anywhere it would be France. They live very close to France and experiences of other friends there suggest that Pakistanis/Muslims were treated better, and accepted better in this region of France than in Kortrijk and Mennen in Belgium. (Pakistani female, 40, resident Belgium)

Generally, Pakistanis who had lived in the UK before moving to Belgium and France also argued that UK was a better place for Muslims. This was related to a perceived greater freedom for religious practice in the UK, and policies of cultural pluralism, as well as the sheer number of Pakistanis living in specific regions there:

For SN, religion and security coupled with shelter were issues that were more important than feeling British or Pakistani. When speaking of being British, she said she felt proud of being British as it gave her good feelings and an identity. She said she felt at home due to the community and being free to practice religion and other customs. (Pakistani female, 40, resident Belgium)

In this sense, Pakistanis seemed to be particularly attached to the UK as an environment, perhaps the result of a postcolonial affinity or familiarity. In addition to this we found some favouritism of respondents towards their own country of residence relative to other European countries, particularly from Moroccans in the Netherlands, but again this was located to local policies and experiences.

It makes me very happy to be living in the Netherlands. The social security, infrastructure, education - everything is better in the Netherlands. Another thing that I like about the Netherlands is the fact that everything is close by. You can always get your groceries close by, you don't have to travel to the other side of the city to a mega mall and cross twenty aisles in a supermarket to get your cigarettes. (Moroccan female, 35 years, resident Netherlands)

2.4 Muslims as seen in the media

The second aspect that may influence perceived acceptance by the majority is the image of Muslims in the media. This might be a factor that immigrants consider when talking about ethnic identity. It is often stated that; a) Muslims are pictured negatively in the media, and; b) that the differences that exist among them are ignored, often presenting a generalised picture (Koomen et al, in press). We will now consider if there is any evidence for this. The newspaper articles that were gathered by the EURISLAM team were coded in such a way that a score could be given to indicate how positive or negative a claim made about or by Muslims was. A score between -1 and +1 was given to each claim to represent its stance vis-à-vis the position of Islam and Muslims in society. By averaging the scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtain an aggregated, yet helpful indicator of the discursive context in this field. The general indicator per country is presented in table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Mean position of the claims in major national newspapers

	Mean	Std. error	N
Netherlands	.23	.792	805
Germany	-.17	.951	769
Switzerland	.03	.888	775
United Kingdom	.23	.560	1141
Belgium	.09	.815	784
France	.26	.679	426

The first conclusion is that the mean score on this index is in general nearer to zero than to minus one or plus one. This means that, though we find a lot of positive and negative scores on each claim separately, overall there is a balance between the number positive and negative claims. Our six countries can be placed in three groups: 1) countries that offer a relatively open and “positive” context (**France, The Netherlands, and the UK**), 2) countries that are more closed, but still on the positive side (**Belgium and Switzerland**), 3) countries with a particularly closed and “negative” context (**Germany**). Consequently, Muslims in different countries face very different discursive contexts, which might influence their capability to integrate socially, politically, and culturally. For instance in a negative setting, the public might be more prejudiced and employers might be more reluctant to hire them. In addition, positions are more polarized in certain countries than in others, as indicated by the standard errors. Specifically, claim-making in this field seems most polarized in **Germany** and least so in **the UK** and **France**, where a larger consensus seems to emerge towards a positive stance vis-à-vis Muslims.

Now we will use the media data to find out whether Muslims are really so often treated as one single category as some authors assume? Analysing what the objects of the claim in the newspapers were, we can draw conclusions about the percentage of claims that address Muslims in general or Islam in general, without distinction or subgroups. As table 2.4 shows, for instance in **The Netherlands** in 42 % of the cases we see generalisation: namely under ‘Muslims as actors’ (in 32.3 + 2.6 % of the cases) and under ‘Islam as religion’ (7.0 + 0.1 % of the cases), together this adds up for 42% (all purple boxes in **The Netherlands**). Looking at minorities/small groups the phenomenon occurs much less: all together in **The Netherlands** just in 14.6 % of the cases (all green boxes; 12.6% for ‘minority/a small group’ and 2.0 % + 0.9 % for minority currents within Islam and specific religious streams within Islam).

Table 2.4: Objects of the claims found in newspaper articles on Muslims (in percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Muslims as actors	60.4	89.9	78.1	63.8	79.4	41.0
All Muslims in general	32.3	12.6	42.3	26.5	23.8	22.0
Majority/most Muslims	2.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	3.1	1.1
Minority / a small group	12.6	50.1	14.4	18.3	36.7	6.8
Individual Muslims	11.4	22.2	18.4	15.1	15.3	8.3
Unclassifiable Muslims	1.5	3.3	1.5	2.5	.5	2.8
Islam as religion	10.5	7.6	14.6	2.9	8.9	18.4
Islam in general	7.0	2.3	11.9	2.0	7.6	10.2
Islam mainstream	.1	.1	.3	.0	.0	2.1
Minority currents within Islam	2.0	.0	1.0	.0	.2	1.1
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	.9	5.2	1.4	.8	.9	4.1
Unclassifiable Islam	.5	.0	.0	.1	.2	.9
No Muslim object	29.2	2.4	7.3	33.4	11.7	40.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	888	784	790	1173	812	469

Purple: generalizing Muslims and Islam; green: distinguishing specific categories

The outcomes concerning the row on ‘minority/a small group of Muslims’ (green) shows that in **Germany** and **Belgium** there are more of these specific claims, while the opposite is true for **The Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom** and **France**. Talking about Islam in general compared to minority currents within Islam takes more often place in **Switzerland** and **France**, than in the other countries.

2.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter we have looked at the ethnic and religious identity of the Muslim groupings in our study. Figure 2.5 shows how we have conceptualised the elements of ethnic identity for this chapter into ‘self-identification’ and ‘opinions of others’, and which indicators we have chosen from the three datasets.


On self-identification, we can shortly summarize the following conclusions:

1. Turks tend to identify stronger with their country of origin than the three other ethnic groups in five European countries but not in **France**.
2. There is no clear difference between groups or countries in the identification with the country of settlement.
3. The interviewees in the survey of all four ethnic groups in all six countries do not identify very strongly as Muslims (all scores are lower than 31,6 per cent). There is no clear difference between ethnic groups or countries in this.
4. Muslim leaders tend to define their organisations most of the time as a Muslim organisation in all countries and among all ethnic groups.
5. The results of the transnational family interviews are mixed. More analysis is needed to explain the different experiences of family members in the different countries.

Our data show that the respondents of the survey of the four Muslim ethnic groups in the six European countries differ considerably and that there is only a limited tendency to identify as Muslims. On the other hand, the leaders of the organisations tend to present

the organisations most of the time in religious terms and call the organisation a Muslim organisation. Leaders seem more convinced of the Muslim identity than the public. Therefore we conclude that the leaders in the interview sample cannot speak for the whole Turkish, Moroccan, Pakistani or Ex-Yugoslavian community as present in the survey sample. Leaders represent the more religious part of the community and therefore the views of the less religious Muslims are underrepresented. The way in which leaders view their position, is obviously highly related to the role that leaders themselves want to fulfil in a community.

Figure 2.5 Elements of ethnic identity (see van Heelsum, 1997).



The following conclusions concern the second element of ethnic identity that we have covered in this chapter, the way others look at the Muslim communities:

6. The national majority shows least acceptance of immigrants in **the UK** and most in **The Netherlands** and **France**.
7. Turks, Moroccans and ex-Yugoslavs feel least accepted in **the UK**, but Pakistanis don't have this problem. For the other countries the differences are not very big.
8. The debate on Muslims in general is negative in **Germany** and either neutral or positive in the other countries.
9. The tendency to speak about Muslims in general is stronger in **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland**, while mentioning a particular minority of Muslims is observed more often in **Germany** and to some extent also in **Belgium**.

If one single conclusion can be drawn from these points, it is probably that we cannot give one simple answer to the question about differences between countries or ethnic groups. Where the views of the majority and the feelings of acceptance among minority individuals at least show a little consistency, this is not the case when we add the two elements of the media debate. Acceptance is lowest in **the UK**, while the media debate in **Germany** is

relatively hard and negative, and the tendency to generalise and turn Muslims into one category is more visible in **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland**. Every country seems to have its own special way in which opinions are shown, but in all the countries of this study there is some form of negativity present. One lesson can be learned looking at the results of this chapter: generalised conclusions on the ethnic identity of Muslims in these six European countries cannot easily, and, perhaps, should not be drawn.

3. Religious practices

3.1 National policies and accommodation of religious practices


The accommodation of Islamic religious practices has proven to be a highly contentious issue in Western Europe and in our six countries there exists a variety of approaches in accommodating Muslim immigrants culturally and religiously. The different approaches and the understanding of these differences also have led to an archetypical division in immigration countries, such as multicultural **Britain** or republican **France**. What we aim to do in this chapter is take a systemic look at the accommodation of Islamic practices and compare these to attitudes towards religious practices among the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. We begin by presenting some data from the first research field '**Legislation and Jurisprudence**' on the allowance of Islamic religious practices outside and in public institutions.

3.1.1 Allowance of Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions

What Islamic religious practices are allowed or accommodated for outside of public institutions? Table 3.1a below summarizes the findings of the EURISLAM project, focusing on the allowance and accommodation of; 1) ritual slaughter; 2) separate sites for burial; 3) burial without coffin; 4) the call to prayer, and 5) the amount of mosques with proper architecture (i.e. a clearly identifiable mosque with for example a minaret) measured in four separate points of time.

For **ritual slaughter** there seems to be a clear change in overall policy around the turn of the millennium with policy becoming more restrictive in **Belgium** while loosening a bit in **Germany**. In **France** and **the UK** the policy remains rather unrestrictive throughout the whole period, while in **Switzerland** the policy remains rather restrictive. For the practice of **burial** in accordance with Islamic rules there appears to be a modest accommodation in providing separate burial sites, but a rather restrictive policy on the allowance of burial without coffin. In the latter type of case, restrictive policies often arise over concerns on the hygienic and environmental risks associated with burial without coffin. With the accommodation of the **call to prayer** or *adhan*, we can identify some distinct differences in policies across our countries. Policies in Wallonia, **France**, and **Switzerland** remain restrictive throughout the whole period, while policies in **The Netherlands** but also **Germany** have become more accommodating. Only in Flanders did policies become more restrictive. Overall, the building of **mosques** with proper architecture seems to be less contentious compared to the other issues. Taking into account the number of Muslims living in each country, **the United Kingdom** has by far the largest number of mosques with **Belgium**, **Germany**, and **The Netherlands** also offering several places of worship. Only in **Switzerland** the situation did become more unaccommodating, which is mainly a reflection of the growing number of Muslims and the limited construction of new mosques.


Table 3.1a: Allowance of Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions




3.1.2 Allowance of Islamic religious practices inside of public institutions

In general there is usually more contention over the allowance of Islamic religious practices within public institutions than outside of the public sector. The allowance of female teachers to wear a headscarf, for example, has been a far greater contested issue than the allowance of Muslims to wear headscarves in general. It would seem that only the most anti-Islamic actors in the public debate would oppose the latter, while a wider variety of actors – among them Muslims – would argue against allowing teachers to wear (Islamic) religious symbols in public schools. Table 3.1b below presents EURISLAM data on the allowance and accommodation of Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions focusing on; 1) the presence of Islamic schools and the amount of 2) state funding these schools receive; 3) Islamic classes in public schools; 4) the allowance of students and 5) teachers to wear headscarves; 6) Islamic religious programming in public broadcasting, and; 7) the provision of imams in prison and 8) in the military.

Table 3.1b: Allowance of Islamic religious practices outside of public institutions





For the allowance of **Islamic schools** and the **state funding** of these schools we see an overall trend towards more accommodating policies. This has especially been the case for **The Netherlands** (from no schools in 1980 to around 45 schools in 2008) and **the United Kingdom** (from no schools in 1980 to 8 schools in 2008). In **France** and **Switzerland** the situation has remained rather restrictive. At the start of 2008, **France** and **Switzerland** were the only two countries that did not even have one state-funded Islamic school. In most countries **Islamic classes** in state schools have been taught in some schools. This does not always mean that there is a huge supply of these classes. In **Germany** for example, Islamic classes were only taught in Berlin in 2002, but in 2008 a couple of pilot projects in elementary schools in Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein could be indicative of an increasing accommodation of (optional) Islamic classes in state schools. A notable exception to this trend is again **France**, where no such Islamic classes can be found in state schools. The allowance for **students and teachers to wear headscarves** shows a split between the rather unrestrictive allowance of the wearing of headscarves for female students and the more restrictive policies on the part of female teachers. All countries except for **Belgium** and **France** allow students to wear a headscarf. **France** used to have a regulation whereby each school could decide individually whether or not to allow a headscarf, but in 2004 a law that bans ostentatious religious signs in public institutions has made **France** the only country that officially does not allow female student to wear headscarves in public schools. **Belgium** occupies an intermediary position, as each school can make individual decisions. For female teachers we have to note that the indicators are missing for all countries for the years 1980 and 1990. The explanation lies in the fact that in the earlier years many European countries had not yet started to draft legislation on headscarves (or *hijab*) in schools. The variation between the remaining years is limited with **The Netherlands** and **the United Kingdom** allowing female teachers to wear a headscarf, while in **France**, **Belgium**, and **Switzerland** this is not allowed. In **Germany** the case is more complicated and as of 2008 not yet officially settled either way. The situation for the

accommodation of **Islamic religious programming in public broadcasting** has been rather static between 1980 and 2008 with only **The Netherlands** and **the United Kingdom** accommodating Islamic broadcasting on public television and radio channels. With the provision of **imams in prison and the military** there has been an interesting development after 2002. Whereas most countries did not provide for or employ imams as religious counsellors in prison or the military in 2002, by 2008 this has changed drastically, with almost every country actively supporting or employing imams to give religious counsel to those in prison or in the military.

3.2 Attitudes towards Islamic religious practices

The indicators presented above illustrate that the allowance and accommodation of Islamic religious practices has not followed a single path across our countries. But how contested are these issues among the Muslim and non-Muslim populations in these countries? To answer this question we will present data from the survey and from the interviews with leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations.

3.2.1 Attitudes towards Islamic religious practices among Muslim groups and non-Muslims

With regard to the indicators on religious accommodation presented in section 3.1, we will consider the opinion of Muslims and non-Muslims on three different issues; 1) the construction of minarets; 2) Islamic religious classes in public schools, and 3) allowing female teachers to wear a headscarf. Table 3.2a below presents results from the survey where respondents were asked to either agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly with the following statement; **‘the construction of minarets should be allowed’**. We present the data in such a way that the bars represent the total percentage of persons answering this question with those disagreeing with the statement (i.e. those against the construction of minarets) fall below the horizontal axis, while those answering in support for the construction of minarets are depicted above the line.

Table 3.2a: ‘The construction of minarets should be allowed’



Unsurprisingly table 3.2a shows that an overall majority of Muslims agrees with the statement that the construction of minarets should be allowed. It is interesting that the support for minaret construction among Muslims seems to be lowest in **Switzerland** where the construction of minarets has been a contentious issue that has only recently been settled with a federal ban on the construction of minarets after a 2009 referendum. There appears to be little variance between the Muslim groups. Only in **France** and **The Netherlands** it appears that the Ex-Yugoslavs lie much closer in their answering to the non-Muslim majority than the other Muslim groups.

Within the Muslim groups and between countries there further appears to be a small difference in the strength of the given answers. This difference is especially notable between **The Netherlands** and **France**; much stronger positive answers were given in France compared to **The Netherlands**. Overall, it seems clear that the non-Muslim majority is less in favour of the construction of mosques than the Muslim groups. This should not come as a surprise and by itself it is not very worrying either. What is perhaps more worrying is the obvious wide gap that exists in **the United Kingdom** between non-Muslims and the Muslim groups. The disagreement with the statement amongst the non-Muslim majority is by itself not even so great when compared to **France**, where a much larger percentage of the non-Muslim majority strongly disagrees, but the scepticism towards minaret construction appears to be a shared value that is also reflected in the opinions of the French Muslim groups. To some extent this appears to be the situation in all countries except in **The United Kingdom** where there is a clear difference being the negative attitude towards minaret construction and the very positive attitudes of the Muslim groups.

Table 3.2b below presents similar data in relation to the statement; '**public schools should offer Muslim religious education for those who want it**'. What is striking about the results presented in Table 3.2b is that there appears to be a clear grouping of countries. In **Belgium** and **Germany**, the general attitudes seem to be largely in favour of Islamic religious classes in state schools. The non-Muslim majority agrees less with this statement but only marginally so. In **Switzerland**, **the Netherlands**, and **France** especially, there seems to be much more disagreement concerning this statement. In **France** the percentages of respondents strongly disagreeing with the statement is substantial, even among the Muslim groups. If we compare this to the indicators of religious accommodation presented above in section 3.1, we can see that this strong negative attitude in **France** coincides with an actual absence of any Islamic religious education in state schools. The opposite is true for **Belgium**, where Islamic religious classes have been accommodated since 1980, here reflected in a generally positive attitude towards the giving of special religious education. Again, the widest gap between the opinions of the non-Muslim majority and the Muslim groups can be found in **the United Kingdom**. The answering in **the United Kingdom** appears to be less strong than in **France** where the bulk of the non-Muslim majority answered to strongly disagree with the statement. Once more, however, this strong opinion among the French majority seems to be partly reflected in the opinion of the French Muslim groups. In **the United Kingdom** this does not seem to be the case at all, hinting that there are very different conceptions among groups with different sets of values.

Finally in table 3.2c below answers to the statement; '**teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear a veil**' are given. The answers are presented in the same way along the horizontal axis, but in contrast to the two other questions, this one is negatively phrased and the answering categories presented above and below the horizontal axis are therefore inversed. From the spread of the answers we can see that this is a more contentious issue compared to the other two, and a clear grouping of countries seems a bit more difficult than with the allowance of Islamic religious classes.

Table 3.2b: ‘Public schools should offer Muslim religious education for those who want it’






Table 3.2c below also gives a clear indication that the overall support for teachers wearing headscarves is much lower than support for the construction of minarets or the provision of Islamic religious education in state schools. This is perhaps so because the other two issues do not necessary infringe so much on the public order as does the latter issue. The allowance of optional Islamic religious education in state schools has very little effect on those who oppose it because they can choose not to partake or disallow their children to partake. To a lesser extend this is also true for the construction of minarets because they are nowhere so numerous that they cannot be easily avoided if somehow deemed disconcerting. For those sceptical of open display of faith in general, or Islamic faith in particular, this becomes a bit more difficult when teachers in public schools are allowed to wear headscarves.

Table 3.2c: ‘Teachers in public schools should NOT be allowed to wear a veil’



Especially in cities with a large Muslim population it is quite probable that a growing number of future teachers will have the Muslim faith and would chose to wear a headscarf if allowed to do so. In **France** where a clear separation of church and state is observed it is therefore not surprising to see that not only a majority of the non-Muslim population thinks that such ostensible religious signs do not belong in the class room, but that this opinion is also shared to some extend within the different Muslim groups. A majority of the French Ex-Yugoslavian Muslims even agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that teachers should not be allowed to wear a veil in public schools. In **Belgium** and **Germany** respondents had shown an overall strong support for the construction of minarets and the allowance of Islamic religious classes in state schools. It is therefore striking to see that the support for teachers to wear headscarves in public schools is rather low in these countries and much higher in **The Netherlands**. Again, the strong negative attitude of the non-Muslim majority in **the United Kingdom** is striking and creates a gap between the non-Muslim majority and the Muslim groups. In comparison, the French non-Muslim majority answered to strongly agree with the statement more frequently, but this is at least partially offset by the presence of a group that strongly disagrees, thus favouring the allowance of teachers to wear headscarves in public schools.

Table 3.2d: Percentage of Muslim women wearing headscarves



For comparison we present the percentage of women in the Muslim groups that report to wear headscarves in table 3.2d. In all countries, Muslim women in the Ex-Yugoslav group appear to wear headscarves only marginally. For most other groups and countries the number varies from around 30 per cent to 60 per cent. Notable exceptions to this are Pakistani women in **Germany** and Turks and Moroccans in **the United Kingdom**. We can see from the table that overall wearing of headscarves is highest in **Germany, Belgium** and **The Netherlands**, and lower in **France, Switzerland** and **the United Kingdom**. This roughly corresponds to public opinions on the allowance for teachers to wear headscarves and in part also to the allowance of students to wear headscarves in section 3.1, although the high percentage reported in **Belgium** lies in contrast with the often-restrictive policies for students and teachers.

3.2.2 Attitudes of Muslim leaders towards religious practices

How do leaders and representatives of Muslim organisation view the importance of religious practices for the communities that they represent? Taking the interview data with leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations we have made an overview of all answers categorised into two main sections; 1) core religious practices, and 2) additional practices. As table 3.2e shows 53 per cent considers the prayer the most relevant religious practice for Muslims. The second issue that is mentioned by a third of the respondents is the Ramadan and other religious festivals. Many of the organisations we have visited mentioned that they organise the prayer and festivals. Other core religious practices mentioned were adherence to religious rules (16.4%) and the wearing of religiously inspired dress (8,2%). It strikes us that in comparison to these last core religious practices, a much more important issue for leaders is the general and religious education of their community (16,4%). We have not put education under religious practices, because a clear separation between religious and secular education cannot always be made. This category therefore includes both Koran and Arabic education, but also regular homework assistance. Many officials mentioned that it is an important issue for all Muslims to educate themselves, as stated in the Koran, and many leaders therefore stress the importance of education to their members.

Table 3.2e: What religious practices are most important (multiple responses)

Main category	Sub categories	%	N
Core religious practices		65,7	48
	Faith / adherence of religious rules	16,4	12
	Prayer / religious practices	53,4	39
	Ramadan / religious festivals	29,4	20
	Religious dress	8,2	6
Additional practices		34,2	25
	Critical thinking	6,5	5
	Community support	6,5	5
	Integration	6,5	5
	Public debate / freedom of speech	8,2	6
	Education	16,4	12
Total organisations			73

Though we asked for religious issues relevant for Muslims, quite a lot of things were mentioned that were not directly religious. For instance 8,2 per cent of respondents mentioned the public debate and freedom of speech, and 6,5 per cent mentioned general issues of integration concerning their community. For many organisations the wellbeing of their community comes first. Being Muslim organisations representing mainly communities of immigrants and their offspring, the fact seems logical that these organisations mention discussing issues of integration and the public debate on Muslims with their community as very important. A statement from a Dutch Turkish organisation illustrates this point:

‘We are a socio cultural organisation with religious fundaments. This is important for us. Originally the group started as a mosque organisation to support the members with their religious duties. It will remain like this and we are clear about this, but besides that we are also a social organisation [...] [We wish to see] to what extend can we stimulate our followers to emancipate, integrate and participate. We are therefore also very active on the social terrain (Turkish organisation, The Netherlands).’

Practices that are mentioned are often things in which the organisation plays an important role. An organisation can organise the prayer, festivals, Koran lessons and homework support, but it cannot influence individual decisions on how to dress.


‘First of all, it is important to be a good human-being. Second, praying [is] important – believing alone is not possible. Then comes wearing [a] headscarf, [or having a] beard, but we don’t force anyone to do this (Pakistani organisation, Germany).’

3.3 Nation debates on religious practices

Finally, we present data from the media content analysis to see which issues are discussed most, how contentious these issues are and what the general tone of the debate is on each issue. Table 3.3a below presents the frequencies of debated issues in the national newspapers between 1999 and 2008. The length of the bar represents the number of claims coded in the entire sample. The colour of the bar represents the mean tone or position of the claims on that issue, which can either be coded as negative (unsupportive of the position of Muslims and Islam in society), neutral (neither supportive nor unsupportive), or positive (in support of the position of Muslims and Islam in society). At the end of each bar that has five or more cases, the variance of the mean score on the tone or position of the claims is also reported to give an indication of the spread of positions in each debate. In combination with the amount of claims and the tone, this can tell us something about the issues, which are especially contested in each national setting. For comparison we ranked the issues in each country according to the number of claims coded throughout the whole period.

Table 3.3a shows that although there is some cross-national variation in the issues discussed in the national printed media, some issues clearly stand out as being most frequently discussed. The construction of mosques and minarets ranks first in four of the six countries. In **Belgium** it ranks second after ritual slaughter, and in **The Netherlands** it ranks third after claims dealing with Islamic schools and the wearing of headscarves for students. What is interesting is that the amount of claims dealing with religious issues appears to be significantly lower in **the United Kingdom** than in any other country. This would indicate that the debate on Muslims and Islam in **the United Kingdom** is not so much centred on religious issues compared to the other countries. This is especially strange with regard to the quite negative attitude of the non-Muslim majority in **the United Kingdom** regarding the construction of minarets, the allowance of Islamic religious classes and the wearing of headscarves by female teachers in state schools. In all countries the top three issues include the construction of mosques and minarets and the wearing of headscarves by either female students or teachers, and it would seem that these issues are most contentious when we look at the media debate. This makes sense, comparing these findings with the indicators of religious accommodation presented in section 3.1, and the opinions of the general public in section 3.2.

Table 3.3a National debates



In **Switzerland**, for example, the most frequently discussed issue in the national media is the construction of mosques and minarets which has an overall neutral tone with a high level of variance, meaning that there are numerous opposing positions in this debate. This finding relates to the Swiss federal policy and the opinion of the general public against the construction of minarets. Another example of this is the discussion of Islamic schools in **The Netherlands**. As indicated, the Dutch policy on Islamic schools has been quite inclusive which has resulted in the establishment of a large number of Islamic schools. In this case it would seem that not the ban or restriction on religious practices, but the provision of special religious institutions sparked a discussion on these topics in the national media. In some cases one might expect a more polarised or generative debate. Consider the wearing of headscarves for female teachers in **France** for example. Not surprisingly this issues rank second, but the general tone of the debate is quite neutral and the variance is low, indicating that the debate in the national media was not extremely polarised. In relation to the wearing of headscarves by female teachers, the survey did already show that there is a much broader consensus among the non-Muslim majority and Muslim groups for restrictive regulation when it comes to the wearing of ostensible religious symbols in public schools. Another factor that might influence the French debate on this issue is the neutrality in which the discussion is held. A discussion that deals directly with the allowance of female Muslim teachers to wear headscarves in public schools can be held without mentioning any one of those words even once, thereby limiting the actual political claims that are explicitly voiced against Muslims and Islam.


4. Dividing Issues

In this chapter we focus on language skills, values, and attitudes towards society and democracy. We will thereby look at what issues could separate and divide the different Muslim groups, and the Muslim groups from the non-Muslim majority. We present language competencies and some cultural and religious attitudes towards society and democracy. Shared norms and values form a basis for democracy in a culturally diverse society. Each democracy assumes a common core of democratic values (see Held 1987), although there is usually some controversy over the content and interpretation of this core. In this chapter we will primarily use survey data on language competencies, shared core values, and attitudes to democracy, and complement this with data from the interviews and the media content analysis.

4.1 Language

For immigrants, being insufficiently proficient with the national language(s) of the society of settlement seems a clear structural obstacle to integration. The idea here is that sharing a common language promotes communication across group boundaries and enhances mutual understanding and identification. Table 4.1 presents the changes over time in the language requirements that immigrants face in legal residency, naturalisation, and family reunion or expansion. Language tests are often a part of mandatory integration courses and the scoring below represents the relative restrictiveness of these courses and tests.

Table 4.1 Language requirements for residency, naturalisation, and family reunion



Between 2002 and 2008 there seems to be a clear change in the language requirements for legal residents. This change to stricter policies for legal residents is also partly reflected in stricter language requirements for spouses and naturalisation. Overall, language policies and requirements were most unrestrictive in **Belgium** and most restrictive in **Germany**.

We can compare these indicators to our survey data and see in which country the different Muslim groups experience difficulty speaking the national language(s). Table 4.2 presents the combined scores of respondents answering 'often' or 'always' to the question; 'how often do you have problems speaking the national language(s)?'

Table 4.2 Often or always problems speaking the national language(s)



Overall, Turks seem to experience the most difficulty as a group, while Moroccans seem to experience less difficulty in general. It is striking that the Muslim respondents in **Germany** seemed to have significantly more problems with the national language than in any other country. As can be expected, Pakistani hardly reported problems speaking the national language in **the UK**. The same can be said for Moroccans in **Belgium** and **Switzerland**, but it is interesting to see that Moroccans in **France** report more difficulty speaking French than do Moroccans in **The Netherlands** report problems speaking Dutch. Obviously the fact that French is a national language of Morocco does not automatically mean that all are equally proficient with it. The high percentage reported for some groups in some countries do perhaps warrant the instalment of stricter language requirements observable in table 4.1 above. However, table 4.2 has made clear that there are also some substantial differences between countries and between groups regarding the overall proficiencies with the national language(s). Whether a lack of language proficiency will actually lead to less contacts and interactions with persons outside of the own group will be discussed in chapter 6. In the remainder of this chapter we will focus on the formation of attitudes towards society and democracy.

4.2 Perceived cultural distance


In this section we will focus on the cultural distance that is perceived between the resident Muslim minorities and the non-Muslim majority in each country. We will first introduce survey data dealing with the perception of cultural distance on three issues that are commonly invoked when the integration of Muslims or Islam is discussed. In addition, we will present some data from the interviews to give an idea of what issues leaders and representatives see as particularly troublesome and divisive, i.e. issues that separate their communities from the non-Muslim majority.

4.2.1 Perceived cultural distance among the general public

In table 4.3 we present the mean scores to the question how different or similar respondents thought that Muslims and non-Muslims are concerning; 1) the way roles are divided between men and women in households; 2) the thoughts they have concerning the role of religion in society, and 3) the way they think about the freedom of speech? Answers were recorded to include values that represent the negative and positive sides of perceived cultural differences (very different, quite different versus very similar, quite similar). Values below zero therefore represent an overall strong believe in the existence of some cultural distance between Muslims and non-Muslims, while positive values are indicative of a stronger believe in cultural similarity between the two groups. The groups in table 4.3 are ordered in accordance with the total perceived cultural distance in descending order, meaning that the first listed groups perceives the most cultural distance between Muslims and non-Muslims and the last groups perceives the least.

What stands in table 4.3 is that in every country the non-Muslim majority group perceives the most cultural distance between Muslims and non-Muslims. Turkish minorities follow the non-Muslim majority in most countries, except for **the United Kingdom** and **The Netherlands** where Pakistanis perceive more cultural distance between Muslims and the non-Muslim majority. Overall Muslims from former Yugoslavia see much less cultural distance and quite frequently stress the similarity between them and the non-Muslim majority. It is also interesting that some issues are systematically seen as more divisive. The role of religion in society is in most cases seen as a very divisive issue, i.e. it is usually perceived to be valued differently between Muslims and non-Muslims. This is less the case for values relating to freedom of speech in society, on which more Muslim groups think that the non-Muslim majority holds similar points of view. This perception is however not shared by the non-Muslim majority, who overall seems to perceive that Muslims think differently on freedom of speech in society. Another interesting point is that the most divisive issue for the non-Muslim majority seems to be the division of roles between men and women in the household, whereas among the Muslim groups this issue is either seen as non-divisive or comes second to the role of religion in society. This indicates that the perceived separation between the non-Muslim majority and resident Muslim minorities in all countries except **the United Kingdom** are related to the position of women and only to a lesser extend purely on religion.

Table 4.3 Perception of cultural distance on certain dividing issues



4.2.2 Views of leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations

In the interviews with leaders and representatives of the Muslim organisations we asked the respondents to indicate what in their views were the major issues separating their communities from the non-Muslim majority in their country. Table 4.4 summarises the answers given by 69 Muslim organisations across our six countries. From the remaining 22 organisations we could not take this information as the time constraints sometimes meant that certain questions were skipped. Perhaps one of the most interesting things about the answers given by the leaders and representatives of these organisations is that a large share (26%) indicated there is really nothing that significantly distinguishes their community from the non-Muslim community. On the question what separated his community from the non-Muslim majority, one respondent stated that there is;

‘Nothing actually, we did not get any hindrance and we stick to European laws, so there is nothing that is difficult or keeps us apart. Islam says that one has to adjust to the country where you live, and live in peace with the people there. Of course there are sometimes issues that can disturb people, like momentarily the law proposal that Islamic slaughter (without anaesthetic) is not allowed which passed the parliament, but if I read the text of the suggested law carefully, there can be all kinds of exceptions, so maybe it can be solved’ (Pakistani organisation, The Netherlands).

Table 4.4 Dividing issues according to Muslim leaders (Multiple responses)

Main category	Subcategory	Description	%	N
None or little			26,0	18
Political and socio-economic issues			24,6	17
	Political participation, rights	Citizenship, minority rights and participation	7,2	5
	Education	Attaining higher education	5,8	4
	Language	Language proficiency	2,9	2
	Unequal treatment	Discrimination, unequal opportunities	8,7	6
	Conflict and traumatic experience	Traumatic experiences / war / conflict	1,4	1
Ethno-cultural and religious issues			47,2	34
	Different values / norms	General difference in values / norms	8,3	6
	Radicalisation	Danger of radicalisation	5,8	4
	Family	Different family values and norms	5,8	4
	Religious dress	Visibility of religious dress	5,8	4
	Religiosity	Different religious values and norms	10,1	7
	Sexuality	Different sexual values and norms	7,2	5
	Sharia	Importance of religious law (Sharia)	1,4	1
	Generation gap	Differences values across generations of migrants	2,9	2
	Misrepresentation / Stereotypes	Negative influence of misrepresentation / stereotypes	13,0	9
Total organisation				69

The view held by leaders and representatives of the Muslim organisations that little or nothing separates the Muslim minorities from the non-Muslim majority in these countries corresponds with the results in table 4.3 where Muslim respondents in some cases perceived cultural similarities rather than diversion vis-à-vis the non-Muslim majority. However, still a larger share of the interviewees did mention some dividing issues, and those had a general tendency to focus more on ethno-cultural and religious issues, and less so on political and socio-economic issues. Having different religious, family, sexual, or

general values were mentioned by 22 of the 69 organisations answering the question. For example, one respondent stated that;

'Islam plays an important role in the lives of Muslims. You cannot say I am a Muslim and I will do everything that God has forbidden. You teach this lesson to boys as well as to girls. Such as sex before marriage, it doesn't matter what age they are; it is simply not allowed. If you approach this issue with a Dutch mentality you will say: my daughter is 18 and I have to give her freedom. I do that too, but I keep an eye on her. Of course they are allowed to study and I hope all Muslims go to university. The question of them moving into dorms or not is very open. Sometimes it's possible and sometimes it's not. If I think my son or daughter is in an environment which will remove them from their religion, I will advise against it' (Moroccan organisation, The Netherlands).

In relation to the finding presented in table 4.3, some interviewees from organisations related to former Yugoslavia were keen on illustrating that the position they take is different and that they are in fact culturally and religiously much closer to the non-Muslim majority than other Muslim groups;

'We are in favour of equality of man and women, I feel very strong about it [...]. I don't mean that equality exists everywhere, of course not. But we have to explain that Bosnians are different from Turks and Moroccans on this issue. Bosnians are more moderate (Bosnian organisation, The Netherlands).

Besides religious issues and the position of Muslim women, it is important to note that many interviewees did mention more structural issues that divided their community from the non-Muslim majority. Especially issues of unequal treatment and discrimination were mentioned by the interviewees. One respondent for example stated that;

'[There is] limited participation [...] on the labour market and [limited] educational opportunities [for our] children. Where can we live if there are no equal opportunities for us in Germany? There is the question of identity between two cultures, ignorance towards Muslim religious practices, [and] discrimination of Muslim women [in] the labour market' (multi-ethnic organisation, Germany).

In the next section we present the issues most frequently discussed in our sample of national newspapers and look if the topics discussed correspond roughly to the issues identified by the leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations.

4.2.3 Debates on Muslims and Islam in the national media

Table 4.5 presents all coded claims from 1999 to 2008 in all 30 national newspapers. Coding was based on the claims-making approach, i.e. based on the substantive content of the claim. In contrast to table 3.3 on religious practices, this table also includes claims that are not directly related to religious issues.

Table 4.5 Issues of all claims (in percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4,1	6,3	6,1	1,9	0,9	3,0
Minority integration politics	76,9	76,8	67,5	68,5	71,7	74,8
Minority integration in general	8,3	4,0	7,6	2,9	3,3	2,8
Minority rights and participation: Citizenship rights	2,0	4,0	2,7	1,9	3,7	3,0
Minority rights and participation: Social rights	4,5	1,4	1,3	3,1	2,7	1,5
Minority rights and participation: Cultural rights	2,7	0,9	0,4	1,7	2,0	3,8
Minority rights and participation: Religious rights	19,6	26,0	24,1	11,9	30,7	30,9
Minority rights and participation: Other rights	0,5	0,3	0,4	0,7	0,2	1,1
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1,9	0,8	2,9	5,4	1,2	1,5
Minority social problems	28,6	38,3	26,1	37,3	26,2	19,6
Inter-ethnic relations	8,8	1,3	2,2	3,8	1,6	10,7
Antiracism/islamophobia	11,3	12,9	15,4	16,0	14,8	14,7
Institutional racism/islamophobia	8,8	8,0	9,6	3,7	5,4	10,0
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia	2,5	4,8	5,8	12,4	9,4	4,7
Islamophobic claims	4,3	2,0	5,3	2,6	8,1	3,2
Actor claims Muslims	3,3	1,9	5,2	9,1	3,9	3,4
Homeland politics	0,9	0,5	1,5	0,9	1,0	0,2
Transnational politics	2,4	1,4	3,7	8,3	3,0	3,2
Other	0,2	0,1	0,5	1,9	0,6	0,9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

We can see that only a small percentage of claims concerning Muslims and Islam are related to immigration, asylum, and alien politics. Most claims deal directly with the issues related to minority integration politics with about a tenth of claims dealing with racism in- and outside of public institutions.

Table 4.6 Claims dealing with minority social problems (in percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Crime	5,5	6,7	4,9	7,6	20,2	3,6
Political extremism and violence	16,2	3,7	11,7	4,1	5,2	4,5
Islamic extremism and violence	49,4	80,3	68,0	74,6	62,4	73,9
Position of women in Islam	11,5	3,0	11,7	2,1	8,0	9,9
Position of women in other minority groups	1,2	0,3	0,0	0,2	0,0	0,0
Anti-Semitism	4,0	1,0	1,0	0,9	0,0	2,7
Homosexuality	8,7	2,3	1,0	2,1	0,9	0,9
Other	3,6	2,7	1,9	8,5	3,3	4,5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Within this category, a large share of claims deals with religious rights and minority social problems. This last category includes claims on Muslim minorities dealing with crime, violence, extremism, and the position of women. In table 4.6 we can see that a vast majority of claims on minority social problems deals with Islamic extremism and, to a lesser extent, with crime, political extremism and the position of women in Islam. Especially in **Germany** the focus on religious extremism seems very strong, whereas in **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** more attention is given to the position of women and political extremism. It further stands out that there is a higher tendency in **Belgium** to report on crimes

committed by minorities. For more details on the claims related to religious rights see chapter 3 and table 3.3.


In conclusion, religious issues are also central to the debate in the national newspapers. Structural issues such as minority social rights or citizenship rights are discussed less frequently, but issues of racism and Islam phobia are in most countries discussed quite regularly. Overall there does not seem to be tremendous differences between the countries. Only when we look a bit closer at claims on minority social problems do we see for example that **Germany** reports more on Islamic extremism and less on political extremism or the position of women in Islam. In general, the issues talked about by the leaders and representatives of the Muslim organisations seem to correspond roughly to the issues debated in the national news media, with both showing a tendency to focus more on religious issues. Compared to the public debate in the national newspapers, however, leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations do seem to mention political and socio-economic issues more frequently.

4.3 Attitudes towards democracy

In the last section of this chapter we will briefly look at two separate questions that deal with attitudes towards democracy and democratic societies. Table 4.7 below gives the mean answer scores on two statements; 1) democracies are good at maintaining order, and 2) democracy might have its problems but it is the best form of governance. Answers were recorded to include negative and positive attitudes towards democracy (strongly disagree and disagree, versus agree and agree strongly). Values below zero represent a general sceptical attitude towards democracy whereas positive values are indicative of a stronger belief in democracy and democratic societies. Again, the groups in table 4.7 are ranked in descending order in accordance with their general support of democracy and attitudes towards democratic societies.

Since the six countries of the EURISLAM project are all democratic societies it would seem at least comforting that there seems to be a strong support for democracy across the board. The only negative value observable is among Muslims from former Yugoslavia in **the United Kingdom** who more often than not believe that democracies are not good at maintaining order. Obviously the breakup of Yugoslavia and the onslaught of the Yugoslav war in the 1990's will play a role in lowering the overall belief that democratic societies are good at maintaining order among some Muslim immigrants from former Yugoslavian territories. Looking at the second statement, however, it becomes clear that even with such a terrible history, Muslims from former Yugoslavia have not lost their faith in democracy all together since many of them still believe it is the best form of governance and in **France** they actually show more support than any other group. Concerning the other groups there appears to be no clear pattern, only that the national majority usually claims a stronger support for democracy and democratic societies than the Muslim groups with **France** as the only exception.

Table 4.7 Attitudes towards democracy and democratic societies



What is interesting is that, as a potential issue that could separate Muslim minorities from the non-Muslim majority in their attitudes and views on society, this issue does not seem to be so divisive at all. Support for democracy between Muslims and non-Muslims seems quite comparable. Especially in **Germany** there seems an almost identical support for democracy and

democratic societies. Even in **the United Kingdom** or **Switzerland** the larger diversion in the attitudes towards democracy between the Muslim minorities and the non-Muslim majority is such that a majority of the different groups still identifies democracy as the best form of governance.

5. Muslims and the media debate

Several authors have stated that Muslims are pictured negatively in the media. In this chapter we will investigate to what extent this is true or not and how Muslims orientate themselves towards this debate. The negative media debate was already noticed in the nineteen eighties and nineties (Sheik et al, 1996; Hussein, 2000). It then focused on for example the backwardness of Muslims and criticism on the position of Muslim women (Said & Walther, 1997; Blalock & Jafri 2000). The problem increased after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the bombings in London and Madrid, and the murder on Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam (Poole, 2002; Shadid & van Koningsveld, 2002; Saeed, 2007; Kumar, 2010; Vanparys et al, in press). These incidents fed journalists with attention for extremism among Muslims and the potential terrorist threats coming from groupings like Al Qaeda. Not all reporting is nuanced and sometimes anti-western views of small extreme groupings are too easily attributed to all Muslims or at least not distinguished from the views of the moderate majority of Muslims. Politicians such as Geert Wilders in **The Netherlands** even publicly stated that Islam is inherently undemocratic. There seems to be a tendency to merge all Muslims into one generalised category and to ignore the differences that exist between the various subgroupings of Islam as a faith and Muslims as believers.

Mass media may have an influence on the public opinion and political figures often try to get access and use mass media to bring their issue forward in an attempt to increase their electorate. On the other hand, representatives of social movements or citizens who feel they need to defend their rights also try to influence the public opinion. Koopmans (2004) argues that the interaction between political authorities and other actors is increasingly mediated by the media and replaced by discursive confrontations in the public sphere. But if Muslim leaders do not appear as often in the European media as politicians do, they might be in a disadvantaged position to put more positive or more nuanced views forward. Mass media functions as a gatekeeper and to a certain extent, it can control what kind of actors and which issues are inserted into the public sphere.

The EURISLAM media content data provides us with information on claims concerning Muslims and Islam appearing in 30 major national newspapers in our six countries from 1999 to 2008. Furthermore, during the interviews a question was asked on how Muslim leaders deal and react to the public debate. In section 5.1 we will look at which actors make claims about Muslims in the national newspapers and what kind of position (positive or negative) these actors take regarding Muslims and Islam. In section 5.2 we will give an indication of the exposure of the Muslims in our survey to the media debate, and in section 5.3 we will turn to the effect this has on the Muslim leaders. Finally, in section 5.4 we will compare the results and come to a conclusion.

5.1 Actors and tone of the debate in the newspapers

Actors that put claims forward about Muslims in newspapers can belong to all kinds of organisations and groupings. By looking at which actors partake in the debate on Muslims and Islam we can find out who has been able to articulate their views publicly. To draw conclusions on the types of actors, we have selected articles with a claim on Muslims or

Islam in six main newspapers in the six countries of the study and coded what kind of actors put these claims forward.

Table 5.1: Actors that made the claims in newspaper articles per country (percentages)

	BE	UK	FR	DE	NL	CH
State actors	34.6	37.6	28.8	54.5	42.5	34.2
Governments	15.2	15.6	16.7	24.2	21.1	15.4
Legislatures	3.8	.6	3.2	3.8	11.1	4.2
Judiciary	7.9	7.9	2.9	13.0	2.7	6.5
Police and security agencies	5.4	12.8	3.2	10.7	5.8	4.4
State agencies dealing with migrants	.6	.0	.3	1.3	.3	1.5
Other state executive agencies	1.6	.7	2.5	1.4	1.5	2.2
Political parties	4.4	5.4	3.6	7.1	6.3	6.6
Civil society actors	51.8	55.0	64.3	35.2	46.7	45.4
Unions	.0	.2	.3	.5	.7	.0
Workers and employees	.1	.6	.0	.3	.1	.0
Employers organisations and firms	.2	1.6	.3	1.0	.9	1.0
Churches	1.7	.9	2.3	3.7	.9	2.8
Christians	.5	1.1	1.3	0	.2	1.4
Media and journalists	4.2	5.0	2.0	7.0	6.0	6.5
Professional groups, think tanks/intellectuals	8.1	8.2	18.3	4.8	15.8	6.6
Muslim organisations and groups	26.0	32.3	29.6	15.9	16.2	18.6
Other minority organisations and groups	.5	.7	2.0	.4	1.8	1.0
Antiracist organisations and groups	1.1	.4	1.3	.1	.4	.4
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations	.5	.5	.2	.0	.7	.7
Solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	.7	1.2	1.3	.6	.7	.7
Racist and extreme right organisations groups	4.7	.7	2.1	.4	1.2	1.4
Other civil society organisations and groups	3.4	1.6	2.6	.4	1.0	4.3
Unknown actors	9.1	2.0	3.3	3.2	4.4	13.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	810	1171	750	784	890	787

Source: Cinalli & Giugni (in press); purple means Muslim actors

In table 5.1 we present the actors that have put forward claims on Muslims and Islam. We have divided the actors into three main categories, namely state actors, political parties, and civil society actors and we created a rest category of unknown actors. As the table shows, civil society actors are the most common claimants in the papers in all countries except for **Germany**. State actors are in all countries second, except for **Germany**, where state actors are the first. Most of the claims made by state actors are put forward by governments.

Among the civil society actors, the Muslim organisations are the most active in the debate. The percentage of Muslim actors varies from 15,9 per cent of the total actors in **Germany** to 32,3 per cent in **the UK**. A continuum is visible with **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** with low numbers of Muslim actors, like **Germany**, while **Belgium** and particularly **France** have a relatively higher number (**France** 29,6 per cent).

The first and most important conclusion is that less than one third of the claims on Muslims are made by Muslims themselves. Two third of the claims about Muslims are made by other people or institutions. The positions of Muslims themselves are therefore relatively less visible in the newspapers than those of other actors. Secondly it strikes us that the differences between the countries are considerable. The causes for these differences are

not immediately obvious. Logically there are two directions in which we can look for the answer. In each country Muslim actors are likely to act differently and, alternatively, journalists and editors might act and respond differently to covering on Muslims and Islam. In the former case the larger number of Muslim actors in **the UK** might be caused by the fact that these actors are more proficient with the national language and therefore can engage more easily with the news media. Bolognani & Statham (in press) also suggest that Muslim organisations in **the UK** are better established, which could make it easier for them as organisations to get public attention for their cause and points of view. If, on the other hand, journalists and other newsmakers play a large role, than this would mean that there is less interest in the personal views of Muslims in **Germany** and **The Netherlands**.

Alternatively, there might be a lack of strong contacts or good relations between journalists and Muslim organisations. In reality it will be likely that a specific form of interactions between journalists and Muslim leaders takes place that depends on the combined attitudes and viewpoints of both types of actors. This relationship can be a fragile one, for example, in situations where journalists are known to hunt for negative news on Muslims or to have prejudiced attitudes against them, they will be mistrusted by leaders who might become less willing to be interviewed or provide any information. This in turn could lead to the situation in which journalists seek out spokespersons less concerned with the neutrality of the debate, thus even worsening the overall tone and polarisation. On the other hand, if more Muslim actors are involved, as seems to be the case in **the UK**, the overall nuance might increase which in turn could relieve some suspicion towards the debate and entice others to partake.

The next question that arises after observing that Muslims are not often actors in the debate is what tone these actors use. As was mentioned in chapter 2 (section 2.3), we have coded the tone of newspaper article on Muslims in such a way that we can distinguish those with a positive tone (+1) and a negative tone (-1). We calculated a mean score on the tone of the debate, and concluded that only in **Germany** the tone of the debate is more often negative than positive. Contrary to what is often assumed in most countries the number of positive articles exceeds the number of negative articles. We will now show which actors use a positive or negative tone. In table 5.2 the mean tone is given for different actors per country.

In the first two rows we see that the generally negative mean score in **Germany** is caused to a large extent by state actors, particularly government, judiciary and police and security agents. Where the mean tone of state actors in **Belgium, France** and **The Netherlands** is neutral, in **the UK** slightly positive (.16) and in **Switzerland** slightly negative (-.14), **Germany** stands out with -.44 with its most negative state actors. It is no surprise that most Muslim actors present positive claims in the newspapers, and that racist and extreme right groups present negative claims. But the score of Muslim actors is not the same in all the countries. The mean score is higher for Dutch Muslims than for Muslims in any other country (.82). The few Muslim actors that get involved in the Dutch debate seem to have a tendency to stronger defend Muslims and Islam. In **Belgium, France, Germany** and **Switzerland** we find a mean score between .52 and .56. There are relatively more Muslim actors making claims in UK newspapers, but they show a much lower mean score than in the other countries. Possibly the fact that more Muslims put claims forward in **the UK** also means that not all of them find it necessary to solely bring forward positive claims.

Table 5.2 Mean tone of the claim by actor and country coded from -1 (negative) to +1 (positive)

	BE	UK	FR	DE	NL	CH
Mean score on debate	.09	.23	.26	-.17	.23	.03
State actors	-.01	.16	.00	-.44	.04	-.14
Governments	.14	.18	.01	-.35	.19	.02
Legislatives	-.35	.14	.43	.00	-.31	-.13
Judiciary	-.03	.10	-.05	-.49	.17	-.22
Police and security agencies	-.43	.14	-.25	-.83	-.02	-.69
State agencies dealing with migrant	.40	.	.00	.20	-.33	-.33
Other state executive agencies	.85	.50	-.16	-.36	.46	.24
Political parties	-.03	.07	-.15	.02	-.09	-.60
Civil society actors	.22	.31	.33	.20	.42	.22
Unions	.	.00	-.50	.00	.33	.
Workers and employees	.00	.14	.	.50	1.00	.
Employers organisations and firms	1.00	.56	-.50	.25	.75	.75
Churches	.07	.50	.41	.24	.38	.29
Christians	1.00	-.08	.20	.	.00	.18
Media and journalists	.15	.19	.07	-.31	.30	-.24
Professional groups, think tanks/intellectuals	.18	.30	.14	.08	.20	.04
Muslim organisations and groups	.52	.36	.55	.51	.82	.56
Other minority organisations and groups	.50	.25	.40	-1.00	.36	.17
Antiracist organisations and groups	.57	.40	.40	1.00	.50	1.00
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations	1.00	.20	1.00	.	.33	1.00
Solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	-.17	.17	.80	.60	.33	.40
Racist and extreme right organisations	-.89	-1.00	-.87	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00
Other civil society organisations and groups	-.41	.75	.17	-.33	.60	-.17
Unknown actors	-.35	-.48	.17	.09	-.19	.00
N*	784	1141	426	769	805	775
* Compared to table 5.1, score 9 has been omitted. Purple means Muslim actors						


5.2 Exposure of Muslims to the debate in the national media

The actual exposure of Muslims in Western Europe to the debate described above will depend on their consumption of mass media in general and, more specifically, on their newspapers reading habit. There are numerous types and ways of media usage and, although there is hardly anyone in Western Europe who does not watch television, there are probably more people who do not regularly read a newspaper. Still, there will usually be overlap in news coverage, making it likely that some of the discussions found in newspapers will intrude through television. In addition, some immigrants may only or mainly read newspapers from their country of origin even though in some countries there are newspapers (or TV stations) in the mother tongue of immigrants that provide a combination of news on the country of origin and the country of settlement.

The EURISLAM survey provides information on the language in which news media are consumed by the respondents. We are not able to pin point whether respondents are exposed to the same newspapers that were studied in the media analysis, nor can we be certain that they actually do read newspapers. We have to deal with the more general question that was asked in the survey: 'If you read newspapers or watch TV, in what language is that?' This means we have an indication of the possible exposure to the debate on Muslims in the Dutch, German, British, French, Belgian and Swiss papers and TV. In

figure 5.1 the results are presented concerning this question per ethnic group. As the table shows Moroccans, ex-Yugoslavs and Pakistanis read/see most in the language of the country of settlement and Turks most in the language of the country of origin or in both languages.

Figure 5.1 Language used when reading newspapers or watching TV by ethnic group and country




Without giving much attention to all kinds of nuances that interfere in this relationship, we could draw a slightly rough conclusion that Turks might be less exposed to the debate on Muslims in the national newspapers, but a few comments need to be made. First the availability of stations and papers from the country of origin obviously differs. We asked an open question to the survey respondents about the newspapers that they read. Though this only gives an indication, it stroke us that a lot of Turkish newspapers occurred in the list, while in the list of TV stations, more Moroccan stations seem to occur. Ex-Yugoslavs have – due to their internal divisions – a very limited number of newspapers and TV stations in their own languages. For Pakistanis there are some TV stations in **the UK**, but an important remark is that in some cases the languages in the country of settlement are also used as one of the languages in the country of origin, like in the case of English for Pakistani and French for Moroccans. So a low reporting of Pakistanis consuming news media in Urdu does not necessarily mean that Pakistani do not see TV programs or read newspapers from Pakistan since these could be in English. A third reason to be very careful with the conclusions is that we know from other sources that Turkish newspapers do seriously cover the debate on Muslims in Western European countries, and that Turks tend to be highly interested in politics and read more newspapers than for instance Moroccans (Phalet & ter Wal, 2004).

To find out where the consumption of news media in the languages of the country of origin is highest we can compare the different countries of settlement in figure 5.2. The table shows that the highest percentages of Muslims who follow the media mainly in the language of the country of settlement live in **The Netherlands, Switzerland, and France**. In **the UK** the highest percentage of Muslims is found who mainly or only use the language of

the country of settlement, but again the fact that English is an official language in Pakistan distorts these findings.

Figure 5.2 Language used when reading newspapers or watching TV by country of settlement



Also here we need to be careful with our conclusion, but these findings might indicate that Muslims in **the UK** are less exposed to the debate in the British media than the Muslims in for instance **The Netherlands**.

5.3 Reactions of Muslim leaders towards the debate in the media

Having seen that a limited number of Muslim actors are represented in the newspapers and not all ethnic groups have the same exposure to the debate, it is interesting to see how the representatives of Muslim organisations view the debate in the newspapers. The representatives of Muslim organisations whom we have interviewed mentioned that they are always aware and most of the time also influenced by what they see as a negative debate on Muslims and Islam in the media. Many interviewees gave examples of what irritated them, for instance:

‘Media is controlled by certain lobbies, a lobby dead against the Muslims. It is projecting the Muslims in a very negative way, we receive many journalists and you give them interviews in good faith and when they write it up, they give mostly negative reports’ (Muslim organisation, United Kingdom).

The representatives of Muslim organisations whom we interviewed seemed to find the negative side of the debate more striking and/or irritating than the positive part. Not a single interviewee mentioned that there is also positive information on Muslims or Islam in the media.


Though most interviewees agree on the negative tone in the debate, this doesn’t mean that all of them undertake action and phone to TV stations and newspapers when they notice

negative statements. We have distinguished three main strategies of Muslim organisations in their way of coping with the negative tone in the media on Muslims:

- 1) Evasive/passive:** the representative explains that the organisational strategy is to go ahead with its internal goals and remains uninvolved as much as possible. In some cases the representative explains that they need to mention to the members that the debate is nonsensical and that they should not get involved. To the outside world they therefore seem to ignore the debate, but internally they will emphasize and convince members that they are doing the right thing and they should not worry too much about public opinion.
- 2) Defensive:** the representative explains that the organisation reacts defensive; publicly defending the Islamic faith, protesting against the negative image, and trying to formulate a more positive identity both internally and externally. Both leaders and members may protest openly on TV and the internal strategy is also to show members how wrong the general picture is and how notable Islam is.
- 3) Discussion:** the representative works with a discussion model in search of cooperation and trying to pacify the non-Muslim public. Multi-faith meetings might be organised and cooperation with non-Muslim but otherwise similar groupings is common just like joining multicultural events. The strategy focuses on looking for similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In figure 5.3 we summarise the percentage of leaders that choose for each strategy. As the figure shows, the most common strategy is the defensive one (38 per cent) while 25 per cent chooses for an evasive/ passive strategy and 27 per cent for a discussion strategy. In 5 per cent of the interviews it was rather unclear what strategy was adopted.

Figure 5.3 Strategies of Muslim leaders to deal with the debate on Islam and Muslims.



After this general picture we will now look at the six countries separately. Table 5.3 shows how the Muslim organisations in the six countries of this study differ in their public debate strategies.

Table 5.3: Public debate strategies (absolute number)

Main category	BE	DE	NL	CH	UK
Evasive / Passive	4	1	3	8	1
Defensive	5	6	2	9	10
Discussion	4	10	1	3	5
Unclear or missing	.	1	6	.	3
Total number of organisations	14	18	14	20	18

In **Belgium** and **Switzerland** there appears to be a distribution closest to the aggregated presentation of data. The two countries that show a notable exception to this are **the United Kingdom** and **Germany**. Organisations in **the United Kingdom** seem to have a relatively more defensive attitude towards media compared to their counterparts in **Germany**, who express their public relations more in line with a debate or discussion model. Note that the debate on itself was coded as much more negative in **Germany**, nevertheless these leaders are choosing for a discussion model. An example how one of the representatives from **Germany** perceives reasons, was categorised in the discussion category, since he states:

‘We have to talk about Islam in this country because it is part of this country; however, it is sad that the topics are limited around marginal topics, such as headscarves. Of course; there are topics to be discussed, such as commonalities or differences of women’s position as they are discussed by some women right defenders, and these are [also] topics discussed in the Islamic countries. Questions such as how do we have to interpret the sharia so it fits to the life today, we have to reinterpret it. We need a Martin Luther who reinterprets it; we need the courage to do this’ (Moroccan organisation, Germany).

In **the UK** more Muslims are present as actors in the newspapers and the debate tends to have both positive and negative sides, but the mean score is positive. An example might make clear how some leaders in **the UK** reason. One Muslim representative from **the UK**, who is categorised as someone with a defensive media strategy, states:

‘The most important thing that could improve is the perception of Muslims that is fostered by the media. It is relentless; it picks odd practices here and there. When your practices are looked down, you do not feel at home. The first generation feels more at home here than the second because they feel that the society sees us as backward and terrorist. I see this with my children. It makes them defend themselves all the time “I am not barbaric, I am a human being, and I have similar aspirations as you”. This war on terror has created big fault lines. [...] The media is playing a big role and you can speak with others, but you cannot say to the media: “let’s sit down and talk”, because that does not sell the papers’ (Non-specific organisation, United Kingdom).

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter the central theme was the effect of the supposed negative media debate. We have analysed which actors are represented in the debate in the newspapers on Muslims, what tone they use, whether the Muslim public is exposed to media in the country of settlement, and how interviewed representatives of Muslim organisations react.

First, the percentage of claims on Muslims and Islam made by Muslims themselves, ranges from 15,9 per cent in **Germany** to 32,3 per cent in **the United Kingdom**. Overall, more is said about Muslims by non-Muslims than by Muslims themselves. Secondly, we have looked at the tone of the debate and calculated a mean score on the tone in the articles. Though it is sometimes stated that there is a lot of negative news on Muslims, our research shows another story. The mean score given to the tone of the debate is only negative in **Germany**. One reason for this might be that the negative articles remain in people’s memory because they arouse strong emotions; a well known psychological phenomena called ‘priming’. In addition it can be, as Vanparys et al. state, that ‘a lot of scholarly work has been overemphasizing the deplorable stigmatization and demonization of Islam and

Muslims in Europe, failing to see that there was also a counter discursive movement which kept topics as accommodation to Islam on the political agenda' (in press: 22-23).

The exposure to the national media debate might be lowest for Turkish immigrants, since they read considerably more Turkish newspapers and watch more Turkish TV stations, while the other Muslim groups mainly read newspapers and watch TV stations in the national language(s) of the countries of settlement.

Muslim leaders tend to notice mainly the negative aspects of the debate and not the positive ones. The largest segment of Muslim leaders feels that they need to defend Islam and the position of Muslims, followed closely by those who wish to interact and get into a discussion with non-Muslims. Some community leaders view their role only internally as chairman of the organisation and therefore they remain passive, while others see an external role for themselves and therefore become more active in the debate. In the case where leaders think they do have an external role, they want to be active in the debate, especially in a context where negative elements attract the most attention and the number of Muslim actors is limited. In those cases there seems to be a need for more of their input.

It is reassuring to conclude that the debate is not only negative and that there are forces that defend the rights and accommodation of Islam. It would be interesting to see what would happen when the number of Muslim actors partaking in the public debate would increase. Though a direct causal relationship is not proven, the UK case suggests, that the tendency to give positive input into the papers seems to diminish when the number of Muslim actors increases. Of course we cannot be sure that the same would happen in **Germany**, where the fact that state actors provide negative input might interfere.

6. Contacts and networks

6.1 Introduction

As noted in the introduction of this report, we view bridging social capital (that is, networks and trust between Muslims and non-Muslims) as one of the important preconditions for peaceful and cohesive relations across cultural boundaries. As Granovetter (1973) has argued, network ties that reach outside the own social group (so-called 'weak ties') are also important for individuals' access to scarce information and resources, such as job opportunities. Others have emphasized the role of support networks of the own ethnic group in facilitating immigrants' socio-economic participation (Portes and Zhou, 1996). However, bridging social capital is also important in the functioning of the multicultural democracy (Fennema and Tillie, 1999, 2001, 2008).

The concept of social capital refers to surplus capacity. Social capital allows x to do what she otherwise would not be able to do. According to Lin (Lin, 1999) social capital can be defined as "resources embedded in a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions (Lin 1999, p.35)." Flap (Flap 1999) has operationalized the concept of social capital in terms of network size, the nature of ties and the resources possessed by those in the network. For example, one can access the labour market through one's network, develop trust to 'others', acquire knowledge about society, develop trust in (political) institutions, or, on the neighbourhood level, build networks to other inhabitants resulting in more social cohesion on the neighbourhood level. Robert Putnam famously wrote that social capital is 'almost good for everything' (Putnam, 2000). It increases job opportunities, health, feelings of safety in neighbourhoods, political participation, political trust, etc.

Both Lin and Flap tend to define social capital from an individual's point of view. Social capital, however, can also be defined at the group level, where it refers to a capacity to obtain collective goals through collaboration (between individuals and organisations). Social capital at the group level is a way of overcoming the collective action dilemma. If two organisations recognize a common interest, social capital, then the network of trust between the organisations mobilizes and coordinates their common actions.

All theorists of social capital seem to share the conviction that the concept consists of two related but analytically separable elements: structure and content. The structural element is often called association and is the actual network between individuals or organisations. The content is referred to as trust or loyalty, often as an attitude towards individuals (trust) or the attitude of all members of an organisation towards the organisation (loyalty). The concept of social capital can be visualized in a graph consisting of points and lines between these points.

When we discuss the social capital of Muslims, a relevant distinction is that of bonding versus bridging social capital. According to Robert Putnam (Putnam, 2000) bonding social capital refers to networks between persons that are socially alike ('people like you') whereas bridging social capital refers to networks that are socially different ('people not like you'). Putnam himself assumes that ethnic minorities tend to have more bonding social capital whereas the white middle class has more bridging social capital. The defining feature of bonding capital lies, according to Putnam, in the sociological characteristics of

two interlocked persons: are they similar or alike. Thus, in our case bonding social capital are the networks between Muslims whereas bridging social capital are the networks between Muslims and non-Muslims. Generalized trust is a core ingredient for the proper working of democratic systems (Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000). Yet when a network of Muslims is isolated from the rest of society, the members of that network have no access to the resources of that society. A healthy democratic society combines both bonding and bridging social capital. And it is bridging social capital that gives access to the resources outside the community. It is also bridging social capital, which generates trust between Muslims and non-Muslims and integrates Muslims in the civic community of a democracy.

In this chapter we will report on the bridging social capital of the Muslim groups and the majority population in our six countries of study. We will start in section 6.2 with the structural side of the networks: how do the networks between Muslims and non-Muslims look like? We will report data on the individual level as well on the organisational level. In section 6.3 we will discuss the content (trust): how are the networks between Muslims and non-Muslims evaluated?

6.2 Bridging social capital

Four questions in our national surveys relate to the bridging social capital of Muslims and the majority population:

- 1) How many neighbours from [out-group] do you know by name and talk to regularly? Possible answers: [+1] almost everyone, [+0,75] a majority, [+0,50] about half, [+0,25] a minority, [-1] (almost) no one.
- 2) How many good friends do you have that are [out-group]? Possible answers: [+1] almost everyone, [+0,75] a majority, [+0,50] about half, [+0,25] a minority, [-1] (almost) no one.
- 3) Do you have family member who live together or are married to [out-group]? Possible answers: [+1] yes, several [+0,50] yes, one [-1] no one.
- 4) How many acquaintances of [out-group] do you know through membership(s) of organisations or associations? Possible answers: [+1] yes, several [+0,50] yes, one [-1] no one.

Table 6.1 presents the mean scores for each measure of bridging social capital in six countries. The order of the ethnic groups in each country represents the aggregate degree of bridging social capital a group has. For example, in **Belgium** Ex-Yugoslavs have the most networks, followed by Moroccans, Pakistani, Turkish and the national majority population. In **the United Kingdom** the order is Pakistani, Moroccans, Turks, Ex-Yugoslavs and the national majority population.

A first result is that in all six countries the national majority population is at the bottom of the bridging social capital ladder. This may not come as a surprise since most Muslim groups live in concentrated areas in the countries (that is, big cities) and most majority population respondents will thus not have the chance to meet a Muslim countryman. However, the 'imbalance' between the Muslim groups and the majority population remains striking. Except for family members, Muslim groups do have majority population close friends, association acquaintances and neighbourhood acquaintances while the other way around this is not the case. This is even more noticeable since there is variation in the

degree of social capital in the majority population: neighbourhood acquaintances are relatively more common than the other forms of bridging social capital. While in **the United Kingdom** and **The Netherlands** the majority population does have close Muslim friends and in **The Netherlands** they do have neighbourhood acquaintances.

In **Belgium**, **France** and **Germany** Ex-Yugoslavs have the most contacts, while In **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** Moroccans are at the top. In all countries except **the United Kingdom**, Ex-Yugoslavs and Moroccans have more contacts than Pakistani and Turks. In three countries (**Belgium**, **Germany** and **Switzerland**) Turkish Muslims are at the bottom, indicating a relatively closed ethnic community. **The United Kingdom** is the exception here: Pakistanis have the most bridging social capital while Ex-Yugoslavs have the less. However, given the lower language barrier of Pakistani in **the United Kingdom** this is hardly a surprise.

If we focus on the various forms of bridging social capital, we can observe that ‘family contacts’ are the most difficult. Almost every group in every country scores negative on this indicator. Exceptions are Moroccans in **Belgium** and **The Netherlands** and Ex-Yugoslavs in **Germany**. Moroccans in **Germany** have a mean score of 0.02. Every other indicator of bridging social capital of Muslim groups scores positive, but there are differences between the three remaining types. ‘Close friends’ score relatively lower. An exception here is the Turks and Pakistanis in **The Netherlands** (the Dutch ‘close friends’ scores are also high compared to other countries. Followed by those in **Switzerland**). Overall out-group ‘association acquaintances’ and ‘neighbourhood acquaintances’ are highest among the ethnic groups we study. However, their popularity varies between countries and between groups: in **Belgium** Muslims know more people from the majority population through associations than through their neighbourhood (except for Turks). In **the United Kingdom** the same goes as in **Belgium** (except for Ex-Yugoslavs). In **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** neighbourhood contacts dominate. The picture in **Germany** and **France** is mixed. In **France** neighbourhood networks are stronger than associational networks for Ex-Yugoslavs and Moroccans while for the Turks and Pakistanis it is the other way around. If we compare neighbourhood networks to associational networks in **Germany**, we see that neighbourhood bridging social capital is higher for Turks and Pakistanis and associational networks are stronger for Ex-Yugoslavs and the two equal for Moroccans.

Table 6.1 Bridging social capital




Table 6.1 reports the bridging social capital on the individual level. In table 6.2 we have a look at the bridging social capital on the organisational level. These figures are not

representative for all the Muslim organisations in our countries, but they give an indication of the out-group contacts of the organisations we interviewed. We distinguish between 'strong contacts', 'moderate contacts' and 'weak contacts'. To illustrate the meaning of these labels, we will give three quotes for each type of contact.

Strong contacts:

'We are a multi-ethnic organisation and also cooperate with indigenous organisations such as family centres, church agencies etc. We have broad networks, participate in more than 30 working teams on local, regional and federal level, are a member of migrant parents network NRW, Forum of migrants in parity, cooperation with Spanish and Greek migrants, and we participate in district festivals. The local communities are sceptical towards us because of our religion (e.g. because many of our staff wears headscarves), it is difficult to obtain subsidies, and they regard us as unprofessional without knowing us. There are a few however that are open and friendly towards us and have supported us and cooperated with us for several years' (Islamic women's organisation, Germany).

'When we opened this mosque this area was very bad. It was infamous for having a lot of drugs on the streets. This building used to be a scouts hall, and there was no mosque in this area even if there were 500 Muslim households, so we decided to open here. We have done a lot of work. After 1 year we have a close relation with our community officer. The police were happy that the crime rate had gone down from 20 registered cases to 3. We have changed the atmosphere here, and even if there is only one Muslim household on the street, all the families are happy with us, they cooperate, they never look down on us, and they feel peace here. People from all paths of life visit us, for example one lady came here with our friend Father Duncan. They were doing a two years course, 17 of them. They were so happy and when I answered questions on Islam, this lady said that she had changed her view on Islam and Muslims. She was a teacher in high school, and she said she would start getting connected with the Muslim community. This is the real Islam, when you connect with people. There are a few people who are troublemakers in all communities. See the Celtic and the Rangers' problems here, but the majority of the people go to watch the match and are not troublemakers' (Muslim organisation, United Kingdom).

Moderate contacts:

'We have, I think, played a very important role, though a bit less in the last years. Information days, good contact with the neighbourhood. If you want to build a mosque you already create a problem from its start. You have to start a court procedure and after some years you will win, and the loser has difficulties to accept that. But fortunately we have built up good relations with our neighbours. Only in the last years, our financial means are not sufficient to keep on organizing activities. Authorities do nearly nothing to stimulate or build bridges, and leave it to you to take responsibility, since we are a common religious organisation, and therefore requests for subsidy are not granted. Tax has to be paid, but when I ask for something, that part is not possible. And this has limited the continuity of activities' (Moroccan organisation, The Netherlands).

Weak contacts:

'Once in a while we have contact with the Christian community but not as a part of a council. We are not in contact with local or national authorities. We don't want to receive publicity or propagate our cause. We are solely concerned with internal matters' (Muslim organisation, The Netherlands).

In **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** the distribution of strong, moderate and weak contacts is rather uniform: (circa) one third of the organisations have strong contacts, one third moderate and one third weak contacts. **Germany** stands out as more than 50% of the Muslim organisations have strong contacts with the host society. In **Belgium** only three out of seventeen organisations have strong contacts, whereas in **the United Kingdom** most organisations have moderate contacts.

Table 6.2 Contact of Muslim organisations with host society

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE
Strong contacts	4	10	5	5	3
Moderate contacts	5	4	3	9	6
Weak contacts	5	4	5	6	8
Total number of organisations	14	18	13	20	17

Overall we can conclude that, with respect to the structural side of bridging social capital, that:

- The national majority population is at the bottom of the bridging social capital ladder. Mean scores are below zero except for **the United Kingdom** and **The Netherlands** where the majority population does have close Muslim friends. In **The Netherlands** the majority population does also have neighbourhood acquaintances.
- In **Belgium, France** and **Germany** Ex-Yugoslavs have the most contacts, while In **The Netherlands** and **Switzerland** Moroccans are at the top. In all countries except **the United Kingdom, Ex-Yugoslavs and Moroccans have more contacts than Pakistani and Turks. In the United Kingdom** Pakistanis have the most bridging social capital while Ex-Yugoslavs have the less bridging social capital.
- If we focus on the various forms of bridging social capital ('family contacts', 'close friends', 'association acquaintances' and 'neighbourhood acquaintances') we can observe that 'family contacts' are the most difficult. Every other indicator of bridging social capital of Muslim groups scores positive. Overall, bridging 'association acquaintances' and 'neighbourhood acquaintances' are highest among the ethnic groups we study.

Now we have reported on the network side of social capital, we will turn to the content, that is, the evaluations of the quality of the networks between Muslims and the majority population in the six countries of our study.

6.3 Attitudes towards inter-group contact

In this section we will study the evaluations of Muslims and the majority populations of specific (imaginary) network relationships. We will discuss attitudes towards out-group acquaintances, attitudes towards inter-group contacts, experienced hostilities and the perception of discrimination based on religion.

Table 6.3 below presents the mean scores for two different attitudes towards inter-group contacts:

- 1) 'Imaging having a [out-group] neighbour marrying a member of [out-group], would you find that [+1] pleasant [0] would not make a difference, or [-1] unpleasant.

- 2) 'Imaging having a [out-group] family member marrying a member of [out-group], would you find that [+1] pleasant [0] would not make a difference, or [-1] unpleasant.

The order of the ethnic groups in each country represents the aggregate level of 'trust' a group has. For example, in **Belgium** Moroccans have the most trust, followed by Ex-Yugoslavs, Pakistanis, Turkish and the national majority population. In **the United Kingdom** the order is Moroccans, Turks, Ex-Yugoslavs, Pakistanis and the national majority population. What is striking again is that in four countries the national majority population has the lowest level of 'trust' (**Belgium, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Switzerland**). Only in France Moroccans score lower and in **Germany** Pakistanis. What is even more remarkable (and worrying), are the similarities for all groups in all countries. Muslim groups evaluate having a non-Muslim neighbour predominantly positive while they negatively judge a (Muslim) family member marrying a non-Muslim. The majority populations evaluate both indicators of 'trust' negatively: they don't like Muslim neighbours and they don't like family members marrying to a Muslim. The degree, to which neighbours and family marriages are judged positively or negatively, differs between groups and countries. But we think that the similarity here is more important than the differences in various degrees of negativity and positivity.

Table 6.3 Attitudes towards out-group acquaintances



In table 6.4 we present the mean score for three different attitudes toward inter-group contact:

1. If you had to hire somebody, which employee would you choose if applicants had the exact same qualifications, possible answers: [+1] non-Muslim, [0] would not make a difference, and [-1] Muslim (for Muslims) and [+1] Muslim, [0] would not make a difference, and [-1] non-Muslim (for non-Muslims). That is, negative scores indicate in-group preference.
2. I would not go to a birthday party or marriage of a non-Muslim [ask only Muslim] / Muslim [ask non-Muslims] if I were to be invited, possible answers: [+1] disagree strongly, [+0,50] disagree, [-0,50] agree and [-1] agree strongly.
3. I try to avoid places where there are a lot of non-Muslims [ask Muslims] / Muslims [ask non-Muslims], possible answers: [+1] disagree strongly, [+0,50] disagree, [-0,50] agree and [-1] agree strongly.

Ethnic groups in countries are ordered according to their general attitudes towards inter-group contact. For example, Ex-Yugoslavs in **Belgium** are most positive and the national majority population in Belgian is relatively less positive.

With respect to birthday parties, marriages and public spaces we can conclude that the attitude for all ethnic groups in all countries is positive. Generally speaking people do not avoid public spaces or social events with many Muslims/non-Muslims. Striking is, however, that the national majority populations in all countries (except **the UK**) have more problems with public spaces than with social events: positive scores are lower for public spaces. More worrying are the negative scores with respect to the question whether religion matters in hiring an employee. Mostly all groups in all countries demonstrate slightly negative scores and the national majority populations express the most negative scores (except in **France** where Moroccans are the most negative). The fact that national majority populations and, to a lesser extent, Muslim communities tend to prefer the in-group in a situation where job applicants have exactly the same qualifications, is disturbing and certainly needs (European) policy attention.

Table 6.4 Attitudes towards inter-group contact





Table 6.5 presents the percentage score on the question ‘Have you ever experienced hostility or unfair treatment towards you by Muslims / non-Muslims. The two possible answers are: ‘Yes’ (below the horizontal axis) and ‘No’ (above the horizontal axis). The good

news is that for almost all groups in all countries a majority did not experience hostilities. The exception is Moroccans in **Germany** where 51.2% of the respondents stated that they had been the victim of hostility or unfair treatment. However, there is another side to the coin. In every country Muslim groups experience more hostility than the national majority population. Absolute percentages are all above 25%: except for Moroccans, Turks and Ex-Yugoslavs in **the UK** (where overall hostility scores are lowest) and Ex-Yugoslavs and Pakistanis in **France** (where hostility scores are also relatively low). The highest hostility scores are for Moroccans in **Belgium** (48%) and, as stated above, **Germany** (51.2%).

Table 6.5 Experienced hostilities




Finally, we present in table 6.6 the percentage score for the survey question ‘In general, how often do you think the Muslims experience hostility or unfair treatment because of their faith?’ This question was only asked in **Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany** and

Switzerland. The four possible answer options are: never, rarely (both above horizontal axis), occasionally and frequently (both below axis).

The first observable result is that the national majority population perceives more discrimination of Muslims than the Muslim groups do themselves. This goes for all the four countries in which this survey question was asked. For example, in **the United Kingdom** 83.7% of the national majority population answers ‘occasionally’ or ‘frequently’, whereas for the Turks this is 35.1%, for the Moroccans 41.2% and for the Pakistanis 45.5% (only Ex-Yugoslavs show a similar result: 73.5%). In **Belgium** for all groups the percentage of people responding ‘occasionally’ or ‘frequently’ is 50% or more. In **Germany** there is a clear difference between Ex-Yugoslavs and Pakistanis (43.8% and 47.3%) versus Moroccans and Turks (65.5% and 76%). The same goes for **Switzerland**: Ex-Yugoslavs and Pakistanis (43.5% and 35.2%), Moroccans and Turks (both 51.2%).

Table 6.6 Perception of discrimination based on religion



7. Explaining the Social-Cultural Integration of Muslims in Europe

In the previous chapters we reported on various indicators of the social-cultural integration of Muslims in Europe: identity, religious practices, dividing issues, coping with the media, contacts and networks. In this chapter we will try to take a first step in explaining the social-cultural integration of European Muslims. In the analyses below we wish to establish to what extent cross-national differences on our various socio-cultural variables persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. Moreover, these analyses can establish to what extent these cross-national differences are stable across Muslim groups from various countries of origin. The survey data will also be used to analyse the issue of the relation between cultural and socio-economic integration. Because of the aforementioned sampling errors in **the United Kingdom**, only members from the different migrant communities who explicitly identify as Muslim will be considered in the multivariate analysis.

We will discuss the key domains introduced in Chapter 1:

- **Language competencies** – as a precondition for communication across cultural boundaries (section 7.1).
- **Mutual identification and acceptance** – as a basis for solidarity across cultural and religious groups (section 7.2).
- **Shared core norms and values** – as a basis for democracy in a culturally diverse society (section 7.3).
- **Bridging social capital** – (social networks and trust) as a basis for social cohesion across cultural groups (section 7.4).

In section 7.5 we summarize the results and conclude on the influence of national context effects, ethnic group effects and individual effects on the social-cultural integration of Muslims in Europe.

Before we turn to the results we want to make some introductory remarks on the tables that follow. In each table we try to explain scores on our indicators of social-cultural integration. We distinguish in each table between country effects (that is, do country levels differ from the reference country), ethnic group effects (that is, do group levels differ from the reference group) and individual effects. **Bold** figures in the tables indicate a statistically significant (negative of positive) result.

7.1 Language competencies

Table 7.1 depicts the multivariate analysis for our four Muslim groups in six countries. The reference country is **France**; the reference ethnic group are Moroccans. A positive parameter indicates more problems with the national language.

Table 7.1 Problems with the national language (OLS)

Ref: France/Moroccan	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	1,810	0,109		16,555	0,000
United Kingdom	-0,095	0,055	-0,031	-1,736	0,083
Belgium	0,314	0,054	0,102	5,803	0,000
Netherlands	0,469	0,055	0,155	8,562	0,000
Germany	0,343	0,050	0,125	6,785	0,000
Switzerland	-0,089	0,053	-0,031	-1,700	0,089
Ex-Yugoslavian	0,163	0,046	0,063	3,551	0,000
Turkish	0,406	0,041	0,171	9,793	0,000
Pakistani	0,229	0,046	0,084	4,986	0,000
Male	-0,111	0,032	-0,050	-3,469	0,001
Education in years	-0,030	0,004	-0,105	-7,304	0,000
(Self)employed	-0,133	0,032	-0,060	-4,096	0,000
Religious identification	0,002	0,015	0,002	0,126	0,900
Bridging social capital	-0,050	0,004	-0,172	-11,627	0,000
First generation	1,202	0,040	0,544	30,075	0,000
1/2 generation	0,282	0,042	0,120	6,705	0,000
N(3690); R ² (.296); Adjusted R ² (.294)					

From this table we can conclude:

- In **Belgium, The Netherlands** and **Germany** problems with the national language are higher than in **France**.
- Ex-Yugoslavs, Turks and Pakistanis experience more difficulties with the national languages than Moroccans. The difference is the greatest for Turks who experience most language difficulties in Europe.
- Men have fewer problems with the national language than women.
- The higher educated have less problems with the national language than the lower educated.
- People in employment have fewer problems with the national language than those who are unemployed.
- The first generation and – to a lesser extent - the one and half generation (which arrived in the country before the age of 18) have more problems with the national language than the second generation.
- Migrants who have more bridging social capital (more contact with members of the national majority) have fewer problems with the national language.

7.2 Mutual identification and acceptance

Table 7.2 shows the results for identification by the national majority and Muslim ethnic minority groups with the particular country of residence. A positive regression coefficient indicates more identification. Reference country is **France**; reference group is the national majority population.

Table 7.2 National identification (OLS)

Ref: France/majority	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	4,219	0,088		47,943	0,000
United Kingdom	-0,473	0,046	-0,154	-10,244	0,000
Belgium	-0,140	0,048	-0,042	-2,903	0,004
Netherlands	0,142	0,050	0,041	2,866	0,004
Germany	-0,387	0,047	-0,122	-8,265	0,000
Switzerland	-0,003	0,047	-0,001	-0,054	0,957
Ex-Yugoslavian	-0,877	0,045	-0,267	-19,402	0,000
Turkish	-1,311	0,044	-0,450	-29,708	0,000
Pakistani	-0,735	0,050	-0,216	-14,622	0,000
Moroccan	-0,765	0,047	-0,240	-16,273	0,000
Male	0,031	0,028	0,013	1,072	0,284
Age	-0,003	0,001	-0,041	-3,277	0,001
Education in years	0,021	0,004	0,064	5,377	0,000
(Self)employed	0,111	0,029	0,046	3,796	0,000
Religious identification	-0,026	0,013	-0,027	-1,984	0,047
N(6114); R ² (.093); Adjusted R ² (.091)					

From this table the conclusions are:

- National identification levels in **the UK, Belgium, The Netherlands and Germany** are lower than in **France**. The level for **Switzerland** is the same as in **France**. Differences are the biggest for **the United Kingdom and Germany**.
- All Muslim groups depict lower identification levels than the national majority population. Turks show the lowest identification figures.
- There is no difference between men and women as far as the identification with the country of residence is concerned.
- Older persons identify slightly less with the country of residence.
- The higher educated identify more to the country of residence than the lower educated, just as those who are employed have a higher level of identification than those who are not. The effects are not very big though.
- Persons with a stronger religious identity also identify somewhat less with the country of residence.

Table 7.3 presents the results of our next indicator of ‘mutual identification and acceptance’: the feelings of acceptance as fellow citizens by the Muslim population in the six countries we study in the EURISLAM project. Reference country is **France**; reference group are the Moroccans.

Table 7.3 Feelings of acceptance as fellow citizens (OLS)

Ref: France/Moroccan	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	3,452	0,154		22,442	0,000
United Kingdom	-0,638	0,072	-0,175	-8,839	0,000
Belgium	-0,057	0,068	-0,017	-0,832	0,406
Netherlands	-0,163	0,069	-0,049	-2,343	0,019
Germany	-0,414	0,065	-0,135	-6,356	0,000
Switzerland	0,034	0,067	0,011	0,516	0,606
Ex-Yugoslavian	0,113	0,057	0,039	1,969	0,049
Turkish	-0,347	0,052	-0,131	-6,629	0,000
Pakistani	0,110	0,058	0,036	1,878	0,060
Male	-0,162	0,041	-0,066	-3,977	0,000
Age	-0,007	0,002	-0,074	-4,593	0,000
Education in years	0,006	0,005	0,020	1,218	0,223
(Self)employed	0,156	0,041	0,063	3,795	0,000
Religious identification	-0,069	0,018	-0,063	-3,774	0,000
Bridging social capital	0,062	0,005	0,191	11,336	0,000
Experienced hostilities	-0,283	0,041	-0,110	-6,933	0,000
N(3550); R ² (.122); Adjusted R ² (.119)					

From table 7.3 we conclude:

- In **the United Kingdom, The Netherlands** and **Germany** Muslims feel less accepted than in **France**. Fellow citizens in **Belgium** and **Switzerland** do not differ from **France**. In **the UK** Muslims feel less accepted.
- Ex-Yugoslavs and Pakistanis feel somewhat more accepted than Moroccans. Turkish Muslims clearly feel less accepted.
- With respect to the individual characteristics we can observe that men feel less accepted as well as younger people. Education does not influence levels of acceptance. Being employed does (somewhat). Religious identification and experienced hostilities decreases the levels of acceptance. Finally, bridging social capital increases the levels of acceptance.

Table 7.4 demonstrates results for the European majority population as far as the acceptance of migrants as fellow citizens is concerned. The reference country is **France**.

Table 7.4 Acceptance of migrants as fellow citizens (OLS)

Ref: France	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	3,439	0,197		17,422	0,000
United Kingdom	-1,208	0,082	-0,539	-14,762	0,000
Belgium	-0,479	0,092	-0,172	-5,220	0,000
Netherlands	-0,218	0,098	-0,072	-2,233	0,026
Germany	-0,402	0,091	-0,154	-4,433	0,000
Switzerland	-0,195	0,088	-0,074	-2,208	0,027
Male	0,033	0,048	0,017	0,693	0,489
Age	-0,002	0,002	-0,042	-1,502	0,133
Education in years	0,019	0,008	0,060	2,337	0,020
(Self)employed	0,076	0,052	0,038	1,468	0,142
Religious identification	-0,001	0,020	-0,001	-0,053	0,957
Bridging social capital	0,058	0,014	0,114	4,279	0,000
Experienced hostilities	-0,188	0,069	-0,067	-2,734	0,006
N(1428); R ² (.192); Adjusted R ² (.185)					

Table 7.4 reveals that:

- In **the UK, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland** acceptance levels of migrants as fellow citizens are all lower than in **France**. Especially **the UK** stands out with relatively low levels of acceptance.
- Higher education levels increases the level of acceptance so does bridging social capital.
- Experienced hostilities with migrants, lowers the level of acceptance of migrants as fellow citizens. This does not come as a surprise.

After discussing Language Competencies and Mutual Identification and Acceptance, we now turn to our third indicator of the social-cultural integration of Muslims in Europe: shared core norms and values.

7.3 Shared core norms and values

In this section we will discuss two indicators of shared core norms and values: the perceived distance towards the out-group and the 'progressiveness' of values. Table 7.5 shows the results for the perceived distance of the out-group. The higher the score, the more distance there is perceived towards the out-group. Reference categories are **France** for the countries and the majority population for the ethnic groups.

Table 7.5 Perceived distance out-group (OLS)

Ref: France/majority	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	8,895	0,221		40,233	0,000
United Kingdom	1,148	0,107	0,199	10,752	0,000
Belgium	0,763	0,110	0,124	6,959	0,000
Netherlands	0,846	0,115	0,131	7,363	0,000
Germany	0,670	0,106	0,116	6,317	0,000
Switzerland	0,214	0,108	0,036	1,992	0,046
Ex-Yugoslavian	-1,935	0,113	-0,313	-17,090	0,000
Turkish	-0,553	0,108	-0,103	-5,124	0,000
Pakistani	-0,968	0,121	-0,152	-8,008	0,000
Moroccan	-1,481	0,117	-0,250	-12,657	0,000
Male	-0,259	0,062	-0,057	-4,151	0,000
Age	0,006	0,002	0,041	2,868	0,004
Education in years	-0,037	0,009	-0,060	-4,261	0,000
(Self)employed	-0,091	0,064	-0,020	-1,427	0,154
Religious identification	0,184	0,029	0,101	6,335	0,000
Bridging social capital	-0,099	0,010	-0,174	-10,399	0,000
Experience hostilities	0,251	0,069	0,051	3,655	0,000
N(4447); R^2 (.155); Adjusted R^2 (.152)					

From table 7.5 we conclude:

- Perception of out-group distance is lowest in **France** and highest in **the United Kingdom**, followed by **The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland**.
- Muslims perceive less distance than the national majority group. Ex-Yugoslavians perceive the least distance, followed by respectively Moroccans, Pakistanis and Turks.
- Men perceive less distance than women and the higher educated perceive less distance than the lower educated. Persons with a stronger religious identity perceive more distance, as well as those who have experienced some hostilities with the out-group. Those with more bridging social capital perceive less distance *vis-à-vis* the out-group.

Table 7.6 presents the model for conservatism/progressiveness (measured through attitudes with regard to abortion, homosexuality and premarital sex). The higher the score the more progressive one is. Once again we take autochthonous French as the reference category. We can observe that:

- In **the UK, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland** people are less progressive than in **France**. People in **The Netherlands** are more progressive on these issues than in **France**.
- Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans and Ex-Yugoslavians are considerably less progressive than the national majority group.
- Women are more progressive than men, and older persons are less progressive than their younger counterparts. Those with higher education, and those holding in

employment, are more progressive than those who are unemployed or have a lower education. Those who have a stronger religious identity are less progressive, and those with more bridging social capital are more progressive.

Table 7.6 Progressiveness (OLS)

Ref: France/majority	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>β</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	22,327	0,604		36,958	0,000
United Kingdom	-3,121	0,315	-0,148	-9,913	0,000
Belgium	-1,810	0,322	-0,081	-5,622	0,000
Netherlands	0,711	0,332	0,031	2,143	0,032
Germany	-1,494	0,311	-0,072	-4,805	0,000
Switzerland	-0,143	0,316	-0,007	-0,451	0,652
Ex-Yugoslavian	-8,084	0,332	-0,370	-24,365	0,000
Turkish	-10,037	0,318	-0,516	-31,589	0,000
Pakistani	-10,249	0,359	-0,441	-28,544	0,000
Moroccan	-9,221	0,346	-0,430	-26,680	0,000
Male	-0,616	0,186	-0,038	-3,316	0,001
Age	-0,023	0,006	-0,042	-3,497	0,000
Education in years	0,171	0,026	0,077	6,660	0,000
(Self)employed	1,033	0,190	0,063	5,439	0,000
Religious identification	-1,520	0,085	-0,234	-17,883	0,000
Bridging social capital	0,366	0,028	0,181	12,861	0,000
N(4774); R ² (.284); Adjusted R ² (.283)					

7.4 Bridging social capital

Our final topic deals with explaining the amount of bridging social capital of the national majority population and the Muslim groups in our six countries under study (measured through levels of acquaintances in the out-group). The higher the score, the more bridging social capital with the out-group one has. The reference categories in table 7.7 are France and the national majority population.

Table 7.7 Bridging social capital (OLS)

Ref: France/majority	<i>B</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)	6,877	0,390		17,653	0,000
United Kingdom	-0,161	0,169	-0,016	-0,957	0,339
Belgium	0,768	0,172	0,071	4,479	0,000
Netherlands	2,514	0,176	0,221	14,252	0,000
Germany	0,488	0,166	0,048	2,939	0,003
Switzerland	0,426	0,168	0,041	2,539	0,011
Ex-Yugoslavian	4,563	0,169	0,419	27,007	0,000
Turkish	4,232	0,156	0,446	27,078	0,000
Pakistani	4,658	0,177	0,416	26,370	0,000
Moroccan	5,065	0,170	0,486	29,873	0,000
Male	0,390	0,098	0,049	3,997	0,000
Age	-0,003	0,003	-0,011	-0,901	0,368
Education in years	0,047	0,014	0,042	3,420	0,001
(Self)employed	0,425	0,099	0,053	4,289	0,000
Religious identification	-0,335	0,045	-0,105	-7,412	0,000
Experienced hostilities	0,384	0,107	0,044	3,589	0,000
Perceived distance	-0,241	0,023	-0,137	-10,399	0,000
N(4447); R ² (.224); Adjusted R ² (.222)					

- We observe that there exists more bridging social capital in **Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland**, and less bridging social capital in **the United Kingdom**.
- Unsurprisingly, all Muslim groups have more bridging social capital than the ethnic majority group.
- The higher educated and people in employment have more bridging social capital and men have more bridging social capital than women. Those with a stronger religious identity and those who perceive a greater distance vis-à-vis the out-group have less bridging social capital. Those who have experienced hostilities involving the out-group have more bridging social capital.

Having presented the results of our regression analyses, we now try to summarize them in a well-organized manner and try to draw some overall conclusions as to the determinants of the social-cultural integration of European Muslims.

7.5 Conclusion

Our multivariate analysis focused on language competencies, religious identification, bridging social capital, mutual identification and acceptance, and shared core norms and values. Regarding the attributes of language competencies, religious identification, and bridging social capital, the results of the regression analysis show that men have fewer problems with the national language than women. The higher educated have less problems with the national language than the lower educated. People in employment have fewer problems with the national language than those who are unemployed. The first generation and – to a lesser extent - the one and half generation (which arrived in the country before the age of 18) have more problems with the national language than the second generation.

Migrants having more bridging social capital (more contact with members of the national majority) experience less problems with the national language. Controlling for all these variables, Moroccans have more difficulty with the national language in **Belgium, Germany** and **The Netherlands** than they have in **France**. In **Switzerland** and **the United Kingdom**, Moroccans have a better mastery of the national language than in **France**. In France, ex-Yugoslavs, Turks and Pakistanis have more trouble with French than Moroccans. For religious identity, the regression analysis shows that men have a weaker religious identity compared to women, while older persons have a stronger religious identity than their younger counterparts. Those with a higher education identify less with religion, as do those who are in employment. In **the United Kingdom** and **The Netherlands** people have less strongly pronounced religious identities, and, compared to the national majority all Muslim groups have much stronger religious identities. For bridging social capital, the result of the regression analysis shows that there is more bridging social capital in **Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland**, and less bridging social capital in **the United Kingdom**. The higher educated and people in employment have more bridging capital. Men have more bridging social capital than women, and, unsurprisingly, all Muslim groups have more bridging capital than the ethnic majority group. Those with a stronger religious identity and those who perceive a greater distance vis-à-vis de out-group have less bridging social capital. Those who have experienced hostilities involving the out-group have more bridging social capital.

Regarding attitudes measured in mutual identification and acceptance, and regarding the shared core norms and values, the results of the regression analysis show that men identify more strongly to the country of residence than women. The higher educated also identify more to the country of residence than the lower educated, just as those who are in employment have a higher level of identification than those who are not. Older persons identify less with the country of residence, and persons with a stronger religious identity also identify less with the country of residence. Men from the four Muslim groups feel less accepted as fellow citizens than women. People, who are in employment, and those who have a higher level of education, feel more accepted as fellow citizens. Older people feel slightly less excepted than younger people. Feelings of acceptance are lower in **the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Germany** compared to **France**.

Moreover, ex-Yugoslavian and Pakistani groups feel more excepted compared to Moroccans and Turks. Persons who have a stronger religious identity feel less accepted as fellow citizens, and persons who have experienced hostilities involving the national majority also feel less accepted. Those with more bridging social capital feel more accepted as fellow citizens. For the acceptance of migrants as fellow citizens by the national majority we have observed that there is no statistically significant difference in the attitudes of men and women. Those who are in employment, and those who have a higher education, have a larger inclination to accept Muslims.

In comparison to the French – and controlling for gender, educational level and employment status –, the British, Belgians, Germans, Swiss and Dutch are less inclined to accept Muslims as fellow citizens. The gap is the biggest between the British and the French and the smallest between the French and the Dutch. Persons who have experienced hostilities involving migrants are less inclined to accept Muslims as fellow citizens. Those with more bridging social capital are more inclined to accept migrants as fellow citizens.

Perception of out-group distance is the highest in **the United Kingdom**, followed by **The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland**. Muslims perceive less distance than the national majority group. Ex-Yugoslavians perceive the least distance, followed by

respectively Moroccans, Pakistanis and Turks. Men perceive less distance than women, the higher educated perceive less distance than the lower educated, as do those in employment compared to those not having a job. Persons with a stronger religious identity perceive more distance, as well as those who have experienced some hostilities with the out-group. Those with more bridging social capital perceive less distance *vis-à-vis* the out-group.

Finally regarding the level of progressiveness, women are more progressive than men, and older persons are less progressive than their younger counterparts. Those with higher education, and those holding in employment, are more progressive than those who are unemployed or have a lower education. **The UK, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland** are less progressive than **France**. People in **The Netherlands** are more progressive on these issues than in **France**. Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans and Ex-Yugoslavians are considerably less progressive than the national majority group. Those who have a stronger religious identity are less progressive, and those with more bridging social capital are more progressive.

Overall, educational attainment, labour market position, religious identification, and bridging social capital, are, when included, all steady factors. However, the impact of these factors is relatively small compared to the effect of belonging to a specific group, i.e. belonging to the Turkish or Moroccan community. Differences between countries exist but these are again usually smaller than the differences observed between the different groups.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations for Policy Implementation

In this last section we will present our main findings and in connection with these findings we will give some recommendations for policy implementation.

Firstly, the issues and questions raised by the Muslims' presence in Europe are largely framed as relating to integration, which is the dominant theme that discursively structures the public debates on Muslims and Islam. Religious rights and minority social problems are the most often tackled issues within this field. Because this framing as an integration issue, the Muslim question in Europe is very much dependent on national characteristics. National traditions concerning immigration policies play a significant role in the ways integration is debated and institutionalized. The supranational level, on the other hand, is only marginally addressed in the public debate in which supranational actors play only a minor role, corroborating the fact that the public debate on Islam and Muslims remain largely a national affair. Therefore, as in other fields on which the European Commission has taken a pro-active role (for example, the fight against discriminations), it would be worth, to avoid the emergence of particularisms, to articulate the European public debate on Muslim integration more at the supranational level than at the national, regional, or local level. Furthermore, the debate is merely characterized by a bi-directional communication between the states and Muslims organisations. Civil society actors as a relevant addressee are quite absent from it.

Therefore, we recommend the following suggestions for policy implementation:

- States might endorse a more mediating stance between civil society actors and Muslim organisations, supporting and criticizing not only the latter, but also the actors related to them. This might foster better forms of institutional negotiation of the accommodation of Muslims.
- Muslim organisations should not consider public institutions as the only significant addressee of their claims, but also open their discourse to other actors of civil society. This might entail a process through which the repertoire of actions and claims of these organisations are not only centred around their specific (religious) interest, but also around more general issues in collaboration with other civil society actors. Such a process would, on the one hand, allow them to develop a broader social and political capital and, on the other hand, to have a public visibility not only linked to religious issues.
- Professional organisations and antiracist organisations can be very relevant actors in addressing issues on which they are competent and specialized. Through their increasing public visibility and participation to networks of actors addressing specific issues (for example, conflicts between labour law and religious rights as in the case of the

headscarve), these organisations can have a very fruitful pragmatic role of mediation among the state and Muslim organisations about problematic issues.

- Media discourse structures and consolidates the public perceptions there are of Muslims. In order to avoid the persistence of negative representations, they should not focus their coverage on Islam and Muslims only when dramatic events mark the international, national, or local agenda. Instead, some space should also be provided to cover the negotiations between the state and the different actors involved in the process of finding solutions to specific issues. This should be done in a more neutral way.

Secondly, educational attainment, labour market position, religious identification, and bridging social capital (networks between Muslims and non-Muslims), are all steady factors in explaining the social-cultural integration of European Muslims. However, the impact of these factors is relatively small compared to the effect of belonging to a specific group, i.e. belonging to the Turkish or Moroccan community. Differences between countries exist but these are usually smaller than the differences observed between the different groups. Therefore, policies promoting the social-cultural integration of European Muslims should be directed towards individual characteristics such as education, labour market position and bridging social capital. Also, since differences between various ethnic groups are relatively big, policies have to be directed towards specific ethnic groups. Policies on the national level are not as important as one would expect.

From these findings we'd like to make the following suggestions for policy implementation:

- To stimulate good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in European societies, it is important to maintain interreligious dialogues and stimulate bridging social capital for religious groupings. The role of civil society actors is important here.
- Policies to stimulate dialogue should not only target Muslims, but also the majority population, since they perceive far more cultural distance than the Muslim groups in our study and have lesser bridging social capital than the Muslim population.
- To promote social-cultural integration policies have to be directed towards individual characteristics such as education, labour market position and bridging social capital.
- Differences between various ethnic groups are relatively big; in addition to the individual characteristics policies have to be directed towards specific ethnic groups.
- Differences on the national level exist but are weaker than differences between ethnic groups. This is an important outcome of the EURISLAM project. Policy efforts therefore should focus on 'lower' levels of (ethnic) communities.

Thirdly, with respect to the Muslim organisations the religious identity remains the most important form of identification for the organisations and the leaders. Core religious practices are mentioned as being most important most frequently. On average one fifth of the organisations

does not identify any substantial barriers between the Muslim population and the majority. Those that do identify some issues, tend to focus on symbolic rather than structural issues. With respect to public debate strategies: on average there appears to be an almost equal distribution of evasive, defensive, and discussion debate strategies among organisations and their leaders. The representatives of the organisations we spoke with presented stronger religious convictions than the people interviewed in the survey, but at the same time they tend to be more 'liberal' than the people in the survey when it comes to democratic principles and women's rights. The organisational leaders tend to present a viewpoint of a modern integrated Muslim in the Western world. With respect to the transnational families, we found similarities across the three types of groups, Pakistanis, Moroccans and Turks, in the way that they viewed their experiences as a transnational family. The reasons behind original migration choices to move to specific countries seemed to be related mainly to a chain migration phenomenon, that is to say the availability of networks on which the migrant can rely for entering the work force or for emotional support. Belonging was often described in contextual ways, and identity was also context-dependent. Being part of the family unit was important, but individual respondents described their sense of belonging as being related mainly to their social networks and lifestyle choices they had been socialized into. Respondents tended to wish to stay where they were already based, because of a sense of belonging and family. With respect to marriage and intermarriage Pakistanis seemed less open to the idea of intermarriage with the native population than Moroccans, and marriage with someone from society of settlement would be preferable with someone from one's own ethnic group. Indeed marrying with someone from 'back home' (country of origin) was seen as a possible source of psychological support and continuity for the family unit in the face of stresses presented by migration. Turks were ambivalent.

From these findings the following two recommendations can be deduced:

- Leaders and representatives of Muslim organisations tend to be (more) liberal when it comes to democratic principles and women's rights. This makes them a good partner and vocal point for the integration of Muslim minorities in Europe.
- The need for national and perhaps even a supra-national umbrella organisation, representing Islam as a faith and Muslims as believers should be discussed.

Lastly, the project evaluates how different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations have affected the European public debate around Islam in the last ten years by identifying principal issues and by describing the interaction between state, social, civil and Muslim actors. The results of our institutional analysis summarize different ways in which nation-states deal with religious and cultural differences.

Therefore we'd like to make this methodological recommendation:

- Results suggest that immigrant citizenship rights are still to some crucial extent a national affair and there are no indications that this is fundamentally changing. Our findings prove the usefulness of a cross-national approach which takes into consideration the relevance of different 'citizenship regimes'.

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Appendix

Methods Research Field 2 'Identity Conceptions'

Media Content Analysis

The dataset has uniformly been built through collection of discursive interventions in each country. Each of these discursive interventions is characterised by a typical structure. Specifically, the structure of claims for our study has been broken down into six elements:

1. Claimants: the actor or actors making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
2. Form of the claim (HOW, by which action is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
3. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
4. The substantive content of the claim (WHAT action is to be undertaken?)
5. The object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)
6. Frame: the justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

Actor, object, addressee, and issue of the discursive intervention are the main variables for data collection and analysis through statistical software. In addition, we have also coded some valuable information on the "position towards the object" so as to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of Muslims. More specific variables allow for both nationally based and a cross-national comparative analyses (see codebook).

The units of analysis are instances of claim-making. An instance of claim-making (shorthand: a claim) is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc.). Decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim.

Our definition of claim-making implies two important delimitations that require some elaboration: (1) instances of claim-making must be the result of purposive strategic action of the claimant and (2) they must be political in nature.

- (1) To qualify as an instance of claim-making, the text had to include a reference to an ongoing or concluded physical or verbal action in the public sphere, i.e. simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors did not count as claim-making (see codebook for some examples). Verbs indicating action included, e.g., said, stated, demanded, criticised, decided, demonstrated, published, voted, wrote, arrested. Nouns directly referring to such action included, e.g., statement, letter, speech, report, blockade, deportation, decision. The occurrence in the newspaper report of such verbs or nouns was a precondition for the coding of a claim. Reports that only referred to "states of mind" or motivations were not coded.

- (2) Collected claims had to be “political,” in the sense that they had to relate to collective social problems and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems.

Claims are coded by random sampling 750 articles selected from five newspapers in each country and covering the period from 1999 to 2008. Every country selected a maximum of five newspapers on the basis of their own criteria to increase representatives of the sample. The articles are sampled from all newspaper sections on the keywords Islam* / Muslim* / Moslem* / mosque / imam / Qur'an (Quran, Qur'ān, Koran, Alcoran or Al-Qur'ān) / headscarf / burqa (burkha, burka or burqua) / minaret. Two categories of claims are coded: (1) claims about Islam and/or Muslims in Western Europe, regardless of the actor; (2) claims by Muslims in Western Europe, regardless of the issue (explicitly Muslim).

To be included, a claim must either be made in one of our countries of coding or be addressed at an actor or institution in one of our countries of coding. Claims are also included if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which the country of coding is a member, on the condition that the claim is substantively (also) relevant for the country of coding. Claims reported in the issue consulted and which did not occur outside the two weeks before the date of appearance of that issue are also coded (but only if they have not already been coded; if they have already coded, additional information can be added to the first claim coded). We code all claims, unless we know that they occurred more than two weeks ago. The date of the claim is also coded, when the date is not mentioned (e.g. recently), the day prior to the newspaper issue is taken as the default.

The following newspapers have been used as a source for the coding: De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, De Telegraaf, and Het Parool in The Netherlands; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick, Tagesanzeiger, Le Matin, and Le Temps in Switzerland; Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, and Tagesspiegel in Germany; Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Sun, and The Times in the UK; Het Laatste Nieuws, Le Soir, Gazet Van Antwerpen, La Dernière Heure, and De Standaard in Belgium; Libération, Le Figaro, Le Monde, La Croix, and Le Point in France. The sampling was stratified in each country so as to have an equal proportion of claims from each newspaper.

Coding has been done by 13 different coders. Reliability tests have been performed in order to check the consistency of coding across the different coders. These tests yield a strong consistency both with regard to the selection of claims and their description. The Chronbach alpha for selection bias (computed on a sample of 15 articles) is 0.905. The Chronback alphas for description bias (computed on a sample of 4 articles) is, respectively, 0.973, 0.976, 0.975, and 0.983, for an average of 0.979.